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I. ANTITRUST AS A REMEDY FOR SPORTS LEAGUES' REFUSAL TO EXPAND
Professional sports leagues are one of the last refuges of unchallenged
monopoly power in America. Most monopolies have been forbidden by
regulation or judicial decree from abusing their market power.1 However,
Major League Baseball, the National Football League ("NFL"), the National
Basketball Association ("NBA"), and the National Hockey League ("NHL")
have each been able to acquire, maintain, and exercise their monopoly power
with little judicial or regulatory oversight. Although the courts have allowed
antitrust challenges to certain aspects of league behavior (such as restrictions on
the free movement of players or franchises), 2 they have not directly challenged
the means by which the owners of professional sports teams achieve their
monopoly profits. The owners have successfully conspired to keep the number
of franchises substantially below that which would exist in a free market. They
have enforced this conspiracy through super majority voting requirements in the
leagues' bylaws which have prevented the leagues from expanding to meet the
demand from cities capable of supporting professional sports franchises. 3 The
resulting artificial scarcity of franchises has given owners the leverage to force
fans and taxpayers to provide them with billions of dollars in subsidies.
4
* Vice-President, Law, Parker-Hannifin Corporation; J.D. 1974, Cornell Law School;
B.A., 1971, Allegheny College. The opinions expressed in this Article are personal to the
author and do not reflect the opinions of Parker-Hannifin Corporation. The author would like
to thank Jon J. Goldwood for his valuable research assistance in connection with this article.
I See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (requiring
electric power company to sell electric power to municipalities); Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (requiring New York Stock Exchange to provide full access by
broker-dealer to facilities of the Exchange); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945) (voiding Associated Press bylaw which allowed newspapers to veto the admission of
their competitors). Numerous regulatory measures control the undue exercise of monopoly
power. For example, the 1992 Cable Act prohibits cable companies from denying fair access
to their facilities by competing delivery systems. 47 U.S.C. § 548(b) (1994). The 1996
Telecommunications Act passed by Congress in February 1996 requires local telephone
companies to allow their rivals to interconnect with their phone systems. See Edmund L.
Andrews, Congress Votes to Reshape Communications Industry, Ending a 4-Year Struggle,
N.Y. Tum, Feb. 2, 1996, at Al, D6.2 See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
3 See infa notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
4 For a description of such subsidies, see notes 102-21 and accompanying text. "As
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Neither the courts nor Congress has yet developed an effective remedy against
this abuse of monopoly power.
The owners' refusal to expand their leagues to meet the demand for
additional franchises constitutes exactly the type of conduct that the antitrust
laws were designed to prevent. Agreements among competitors to limit the
output of a particular product have long been considered one of the most
serious antitrust violations. 5 Such agreements harm consumer welfare by
raising prices, reducing quality, and limiting the range of choices available to
consumers. As the Supreme Court stated in National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Board of Regents:6
A restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer
preference in setting price and output is not consistent with this fundamental
.goal of antitrust law. Restrictions on price and output are the paradigmatic
examples of restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.7
It would be a clear violation of the antitrust laws for a group of competing
steel producers to pool their steel-making capacity in a joint venture and agree
to place a ceiling on the amount of steel produced by the venture.8 The
Senator Frank Lautenberg has observed: 'There is an artificial scarcity of teams that results
from joint decisions of league members and their anticompetitive behavior. Demand is not
met by supply; it is met by ransom and higher price franchises."' Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly
Sports Leagues, 73 MNN. L. REv. 643, 661 (1989). In describing the pressures which teams
have placed on their communities, Neil Austrian, the President of the NFL, recently
commented, "There is a greed level that has overtaken the entire country." Robert J. Vickers,
Cities Need Team Effort, CLEv. PLA[N DEALER, Dec. 17, 1995, at B1, B3.
5 [A]greements among competitors that achieve less than the competitive
marketwide output are a classic concern of the antitrust laws. For a single firm to
produce less than the optimal amount is one thing; for a group of competitors
dominating a market to agree with each other to produce less than the optimal
amount is quite another.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitntst Policy, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 1,61.
6 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
7 Id. at 107-08.
8 For a description of the antitrust standards for analyzing joint ventures, see Joseph F.
Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitnst Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1523 (1982); Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr., Reconciling Competition and Cooperation: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint
Ventures, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 871 (1994) [hereinafter Piraino, Reconciling
Competition]; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis: A
New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1991); Robert Pitofsky, A
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economic effects of the owners' artificial limits on the number of sports
franchises are no less serious. Nevertheless, certain courts and antitrust
commentators argue that sports leagues should not be subject to the same
antitrust standards as other joint ventures. 9 They point out that sports leagues
differ from joint ventures in other industries because teams must cooperate with
each other in order for their product to be available at all.10 According to this
view, professional sports teams compete only on the field; they do not compete
in an economic sense. 11
This Article explains the deficiencies in such a view of sports leagues.
Professional sports teams do, in fact, compete on an economic basis, and the
antitrust laws should not treat them any differently than firms in other
industries. Under the antitrust standards which apply to all other types of joint
ventures, the professional sports leagues should be required to expand to
include all qualified applicants.
A reasonable expansion of the leagues is compelled under two legal
principles developed in the earliest days of antitrust jurisprudence. The
"essential facilities" doctrine, which was first set forth by the Supreme Court in
1912,12 requires that joint ventures adopt open membership policies when they
control resources essential for effective competition in the relevant market.
Since no team can participate in a major professional sport other than through
Major League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, or the NHL, the leagues should be
deemed to be essential facilities. As such, they should be precluded from
enforcing the unreasonably exclusionary membership restrictions currently in
effect. 13
Frameworkfor Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74 GEo. L.J. 1605 (1986).
9 See supra note 8.
10 See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); San Francisco
Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Myron C.
Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section I of the
Shennan Act: Implications of the Consuner Welfare Model, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1983);
Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 108; Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional
Sports Antitrust, the Rule of Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L.
REv. 943 (1988) [hereinafter Roberts, Evolving Confusion]; Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues
and the Shernan Act: The Use and Abuse of Section I to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague
Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REv. 219 (1984) [hereinafter Roberts, Sports Leagues].
11 See Smith, 593 F.2d at 1178-79; San Francisco Seals, 379 F. Supp. at 969-70;
Roberts, Sports Leagues, supra note 10, at 234-35.
12 See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
13 Under the essential facilities doctrine, any joint venture which controls a critical
resource may be required to adopt an open membership policy. In the current American
economy, "network" joint ventures are particularly likely to control technology which firms
must access in order to compete in the relevant market. Thus, credit card systems, real estate
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First conceived in 189814 and recently rediscovered by the federal courts, 15
the "ancillary restraints" doctrine defines the types of membership rules which
the leagues should be permitted to adopt. Under the ancillary restraints
doctrine, the courts have upheld restrictions on competition which are required
to promote the legitimate efficiency objectives of joint ventures. 16 Although the
leagues' current membership rules are broader than necessary for such
objectives, the leagues should be permitted to enforce more narrowly drawn
rules, including objective eligibility standards, reasonable limits on the total
number of teams, and nondiscriminatory requirements for the payment of
franchise fees.17
Taken together, the essential facilities and ancillary restraints doctrines
provide an effective means of analyzing the membership restrictions of sports
leagues. An integration of the two approaches would protect the legitimate
interests of both the leagues and the consumers who have been harmed by the
artificial scarcity of sports franchises. An integrated approach would require the
leagues to open their membership to qualified cities, while permitting the
leagues to retain membership restrictions necessary for their effective operation.
The supply of professional sports franchises would then become more in line
with demand, and the monopoly subsidies currently being exacted by the
leagues would end.
Part II of this Article describes the ways in which sports leagues are similar
to other "essential facility" joint ventures. Part III explains how each of the
major sports leagues has misused its membership restrictions to prevent
expansion to qualified cities. Part IV proposes a legal framework for analyzing
the membership restrictions of each of the sports leagues, and Part V analyzes
the leagues' current membership rules under the proposed legal standard. Part
VI describes the specific types of league membership rules that would be
acceptable under the proposed standard. Part VII explains how the courts may
effectively regulate the expansion of sports leagues under the proposed
standard. Finally, Part VIII discusses potential legal obstacles to the compelled
multiple listing services, and telecommunications and utility networks, as well as sports
leagues, may be deemed essential facilities to which open access is appropriate. See Thomas
A. Piraino, Jr., The Antimist Analysis of Network Joint Ventures, 47 HASrIGS L.J. 1, 52-58
(1995).
14 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as
modified by, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
15 See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
16 For a discussion of the application of the ancillary restraints doctrine in the joint
venture context, see Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New
Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1753, 1780-81 (1994);
Piraino, Reconciling Competition, supra note 8, at 924-32.
17 See infra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.
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expansion of the leagues, including baseball's antitrust exemption, various
statutes, and relevant common law precedent.
II. THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SPORTS LEAGUES
The legal framework for analyzing the membership restrictions of sports
leagues should be derived from an understanding of the leagues' unique
economic characteristics. Major League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, and the
NHL are each joint ventures. Furthermore, the leagues constitute a particular
type of joint venture to which the courts have applied a specially tailored
approach. Each of the leagues is an "essential facility" to which firms must
have access in order to compete in the relevant market. Under the essential
facilities doctrine, the courts have precluded such joint ventures from adopting
exclusionary membership rules.
A. Sports Leagues as Joint Ventures
1. The Nature of Joint Ventures
Joint ventures are a unique form of business organization which require
their own antitrust approach. The uniqueness of joint ventures stems from the
manner in which they blend competition and cooperation. The members of a
joint venture cooperate in order to accomplish certain specific objectives. Yet
their cooperation on joint venture matters does not preclude them from
continuing to compete outside the bounds of the venture.
If the various forms of business organization were classified along a
continuum, joint ventures would lie at a mid-point between cartels and mergers.
Joint ventures are more integrated than cartels but less integrated than mergers.
Joint ventures are further distinguished from cartels by their pro-competitive
purpose. In a joint venture, partners integrate their resources for a specific
purpose, such as the production or marketing of a new product. The
efficiencies created by joint ventures are similar to those resulting from
mergers. Through their collaboration, the partners in a joint venture often can
produce a product which none of the partners could have produced on their
own.18 Yet joint ventures also differ from mergers. Unlike mergers, they do
not involve a complete integration of the partners' operations. Each of the
18 See Joseph F. Brodley, Analyzing Joint Ventures with Foreign Partners, 53
ANfrIRusr L.J. 73, 75 (1984) (characterizing a joint venture as "an integration between firns
that involves a clear addition to productive capacity... the creation of a new product or entry
into a new market").
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members of a joint venture continues its separate existence and continues to
compete with its partners outside the scope of the venture.19
2. Cooperation Within League Joint Ventures
Professional sports leagues possess all the relevant characteristics of joint
ventures. The sports leagues are highly integrated organizations to which
individual teams surrender a large amount of their autonomy in order to ensure
the efficient management of the relevant sport. Indeed, professional sports
could not exist without league rules on matters such as schedules, player
eligibility, and the manner in which games should be played. One of the most
important efficiencies of professional sports leagues is the maintenance of
competitive balance among the various teams. The leagues have implemented
rules for revenue sharing, team salary caps, and the drafting of players to insure
that, over a period of time, each team has an-opportunity to contend for the
championship of a particular sport.20 Without such rules, fan interest in games
would diminish, and the entire league would be adversely affected.21
19 For example, in the mid-1980s, General Motors and Toyota entered into a joint
venture for the manufacture of compact automobiles at a plant in Fremont, California. The
joint venture has not prevented General Motors and Toyota from aggressively competing in
the international automobile market. In fact, General Motors has used knowledge acquired
from the joint venture to improve its manufacturing techniques, and Toyota has used such
knowledge to aid it in making automobiles at a new plant in Kentucky. See Paul C. Judge,
Toyota Plant is Expected for Kentucky, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 1990, at D4; Jeremy Main,
How to Steal the Best Ideas Around, FORTuNE, Oct. 19, 1992, at 102, 106.
20 As Wellington Mara, the owner of the New York Giants, has concluded:
We have a very fragile, delicate thing in this league that allows Green Bay to compete
with the Giants and for Buffalo to compete with Chicago, for small cities to compete
with the big ones. It is sharing, a concept that we are in this thing together, and bylaws
govern our action .... I believe that is one of the things we will constantly fhce in the
future-what's best for the league and what's best for each team. My view has always
been that the league comes first.
Thomas George, Rams Given Green Light for St. Louis Move, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13, 1995,
at B1l, B17.
21 See Joseph P. Bauer, Antitnt and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace
Competition in the Marketplace?, 60 TENN. L. REv. 263, 276 (1993). Some studies have
indicated that league attendance increases when championship races are closely contested. See
Ross, supra note 4, at 670. The All-America Conference, a league which competed with the
NFL in the 1940s, failed in part because the domination of the league by the Cleveland
Browns for several years decreased fan attendance, even in Cleveland itself. See Grauer,
supra note 10, at 24.
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Because of the need to maintain competitive balance, sports teams do not
compete off the field in the same way as independent firms. As one court
pointed out, "[n]o NFL team... is interested in driving another team out of
business, whether in the counting-house or on the football field, for if the
League fails, no one team can survive." 22 Some courts and commentators have
concluded that cooperation among the members of sports leagues is so
pervasive that teams should not be regarded as economic competitors at all.
Professor Gary Roberts has argued that individual teams have "no economic
purpose or revenue generating potential independent of their participation in the
league" ;23 since sports teams cannot compete independently of the leagues in
which they are members, the leagues should be viewed as single entities whose
members are incapable of conspiring in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 24 Because section 1 requires a "contract, combination... or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade" among two or more parties, the single entity approach
would exempt all restraints among sports teams from antitrust liability.25
Several courts have supported such an approach by concluding that the
members of professional sports leagues should not be regarded as separate
competitors under the antitrust laws. 26
22 Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also North
Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d Cir. 1982)
("ITMhe economic success of each franchise is dependent on the quality of sports competition
throughout the league and the economic strength and stability of other league members.");
United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953) ("If all the
teams should compete as hard as they can in a business way, the stronger teams would be
likely to drive the weaker ones into financial failure. If this should happen not only would the
weaker teams fail, but eventually the whole league ... would fail... .23 Roberts, Evolving Confision, supra note 10, at 969 n.96.
24 See Roberts, Sports Leagues, supra note 10, at 234 ("The member clubs are not
natural competitors... no one team can rival another league member in marketing a game or
games."); see also ROBERT H. BoRK, Tm ANrI~rusrT PARADox 278 (1978) ("ITMhe league is
best viewed as being the firm."); JOHN C. WEisrART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF
SpoRTs § 5.11, at 701 (1979) ("[lt is proper that the [league] 'agreements' in question are
viewed as essentially internal marketing decisions.").
25 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The court in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commn v.
National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-88 (9th Cir. 1984), recognized that adoption
of the single entity defense would effectively immunize professional sports leagues from
antitrust challenges under section 1.
26 See Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. National Hockey League, 783 F.2d 1347, 1350
(9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that they were illegally denied entry to NHL, on
grounds that they were "not competing with the NHL; [but] they were seeking to join it.");
Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1983) ("There
is no record evidence that professional football teams ... compete. . ... "); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[The NFL clubs which have
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3. Competition Within League Joint Ventures
The courts and commentators favoring the single entity approach have
failed to recognize that, in a joint venture, competition and cooperation are not
mutually exclusive. Indeed, the defining characteristic of a joint venture is the
partners' ability to cooperate on certain matters while continuing to compete on
others. 27 In sports leagues, as in other joint ventures, competition and
cooperation coexist. The members of professional sports leagues share certain
interests in the well-being of their common endeavor, but that commonality
does not override their drive toward individual success. 28 Each team views its
own interests as paramount and attempts to increase its share of league profits.
Like the owners of any other business, team owners are primarily interested in
maximizing the return on their investment. Thus each owner competes to
enhance the value of its own team within the market for the purchase and sale
of sports franchises.29 The professional sports leagues are structured in a
manner which permits teams to compete with each other on an economic as
'combined' to implement the draft are not competitors in any economic sense."); San
Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1974)
("[NHL member clubs] are not competitors in the economic sense in this relevant market.
They are, in fact, all members of a single unit .... ").
2 7 The members of such ventures remain independent competitors despite their
affiliation with the venture. Indeed, the existence of competition among joint venture
members is what distinguishes a network joint venture monopoly from a single firm
monopolist. The members of a network joint venture are not simply stockholders or
partners in the venture; they are competitors whose continued rivalry benefits
consumers. As such, they should not be allowed to conspire among themselves to
prevent potential competitors from entering the primary market.
Piraino, supra note 13, at 26.
2 8 See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1389 ("Although the business
interests of League members will often coincide with those of the NFL as an entity in itself,
that commonality of interest exists in every cartel.").
2 9 This market should be deemed a separate relevant market for antitrust purposes. The
courts have recognized the existence of a specific market for the sale of sports franchises. See
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (characterizing
"the relevant product market as the market for existing American League and National
League baseball teams"); see also North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League,
670 F.2d 1249, 1259 (2d Cir. 1982) (striking down NFL rule precluding NFL owners from
owning franchises in other sports, on grounds that rule foreclosed soccer league from access
to "the market supply of sports capital and skill"); Murray v. National Football League, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9108, at *35 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 1996) ("We cannot conclude, as a matter
of law, that a jury could not find that a market existed for the sale and purchase of NFL
franchises.").
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well as an athletic basis. The teams in each league are separately owned and
managed. Each team "conducts its own accounting, keeps its own profits,
makes its own financial and investment decisions, and generally succeeds or
fails on its own." 30 Although teams share certain revenues (such as those from
national television contracts), they do not share profits, losses, or capital
expenditures, and profits vary widely from team to team. The teams have
separate income streams from local revenue sources such as parking,
concessions, advertising, and radio and television broadcasts. 31
In any joint venture, there is a tension between the members' willingness to
cooperate on matters essential for the venture's success and their natural
inclination to promote their own welfare. In each of the professional sports
leagues, the balance in recent years has begun to shift more toward the teams'
individual interests. To an increasing extent, owners have tended to favor their
own objectives over those of the leagues as a whole. Owners are now more
interested in enhancing the value of their teams than in insuring the leagues'
overall effectiveness. Many owners have even become willing to circumvent
league rules when they perceive such rules to be contrary to their individual
interests.
This increased emphasis on competition over cooperation has been caused,
to a great extent, by the escalation in professional athletes' salaries during the
last decade.32 Professional sports teams have always competed with each other
to attract the best coaches and managers, but with the advent of free agency,
competition has grown to sign the most talented players. Spurred by such
competition, many teams are now attempting to avoid league rules on salary
caps, revenue sharing, and franchise relocation. The Major League Baseball
30 Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 874 F. Supp.
844, 849 (N.D. ll. 1995).
31 See North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1252 (pointing out that each team is a
separate legal entity, with separate income streams, and that expenses and profits are not
shared with other teams); Murray, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9108, at *32 ("It is uncontested
that individual NFL franchises compete within certain geographic regions for players,
coaches, television revenue, ticket sales, sales of team paraphernalia, stadium rights, and the
sale of concession items."); Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitnst, and
the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 31 (1991).
32 Between 1982 and 1993, the average player's annual salary increased from $128,000
to $463,000 in the NHL, from $96,000 to $737,000 in the NFL, from $241,000 to $1.1
million in Major League Baseball, and from $235,000 to $1.4 million in the NBA. See Chuck
Johnson, Miller. Salary Cap Merely Ploy to Avoid Competing for Players, USA TODAY,
Oct. 20, 1994, at C9. The total annual salary costs in the four major sports rose from $1.9
billion in 1991 to $2.9 billion in 1993, an increase of 53%. See Richard Aim, Sports Teams
Play Money Game, THE DALLAs MORNING NEws, Sept. 3,1995, at Al.
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owners have been unable to reach any agreement at all on a salary cap, 33 and
the caps in the NBA and NHL are now so lenient that they have little effect on
competition for players. 34 The NFL has had the strictest salary cap of all the
leagues, but NFL teams have been able to mitigate the effects of the cap by
paying large up-front signing bonuses that can be prorated over the life of a
player's contract. 35
In the NFL, the Dallas Cowboys have been the most aggressive in asserting
their individual interests over those of the league as a whole. The Cowboys, in
fact, have openly defied the NFL's rules on revenue sharing and recently
challenged the league's legal right to enforce such rules.36 Instead of
negotiating its sale of licensed products through the NFL, as required by the
league's bylaws, the team has entered into independent marketing agreements
with Nike, PepsiCo, and American Express. 37 These arrangements allowed the
Cowboys to spend $67.2 million for players in 1995, while other NFL teams
spent as much as forty percent less. 38
33 In 1994, the Major League Baseball owners indicated a willingness to implement
revenue sharing, contingent upon the players' agreement to a salary cap. See Ross Newhan,
Salary Cap Is Sticking Point, L.A. Thms, Aug. 12, 1994, at C1, C6; Allan H. Selig, Players
Must Do Their Part, THE WAsH. PosT, July 24, 1994, at D4. The salary cap proposal
triggered the baseball strike of 1994-1995, which ended without any agreement on a cap. See
Bill Madden & Jere Hester, Baseball Is Back, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Apr. 3, 1995, at A3.
34 The NBA's 1994 salary cap was $15.9 million, but some teams had 1994 payrolls in
excess of $40 million. See Mark Asher, NBA Might Lock Out Players After Final Playoff
Series Ends, THE WASH. PosT, June 13, 1995, at El, E7. The so-called "Larry Bird"
exception to the NBA's salary cap allows teams to exceed the cap when they resign veteran
players. See id. The NBA owners tried to remove the Larry Bird exception in their 1995
negotiations with the players' union, but they only succeeded in modifying the exception to
apply to players in their third year with the same team. See Richard Justice, Finally, NBA
Reaches Its Own Labor Day, THE WASH. PosT, Sept. 5, 1995, at Cl, C8. The NHL owners
attempted to negotiate a salary cap with their players during the NHL strike of 1994-1995,
but they were only able to reach agreement on a cap for rookie players. See Kevin Allen,
Agents Ducking Under Rookie Cap with Performance Bonus Clauses, USA TODAY, July 18,
1995, at C6; Len Hochberg, Last-Minute Deal Saves NL Season, THE WASH. POsT, Jan.
12, 1995, at Al, A13.
35 See Peter King, Down... and Out, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 13, 1995, at 28, 30;
Adam Teicher, N1FL Teams Walk when Money Talks, THE KANSAS Crry STAR, Nov. 12,
1995, at Al.
3 6 After the NFL sued the Cowboys for violating the league's revenue sharing rules, the
Cowboys filed a $750 million suit alleging that the rules violate section 1. See Commissioner
Rips Jones, CLEv. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 29, 1996, at C10.
37 See Dave Anderson, How Jones Bought the Super Bowl, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1996,
atCl.
3 8 See Leonard Shapiro, League's Forward Progress Is Producing Some Major Pileups,
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In order to fund players' salaries, owners are now trying to maximize their
revenue from local sources, such as parking, advertising, concessions, and
luxury suites. A strong local revenue stream can give an owner the upper hand
in attracting the most talented players, because such income is not subject to
revenue sharing under the leagues' bylaws. 39 Many owners have learned during
the last few years that the best way to enhance such revenue streams is to
convince a local government to construct a new stadium. Not only are the
stadiums paid for by the taxpayers, but they are also usually offered to teams at
substantially below-market rental rates.40 Furthermore, the new stadiums
include luxury seating, which provides enormous profits to owners.41
Teams are therefore now engaged in intense competition to obtain the most
favorable stadium packages. The NFL has recently entered an era of "franchise
free agency" in which teams have been relocating at an unprecedented rate to
cities willing to subsidize the construction of new stadiums. The relocation
route was opened in 1984, when the Ninth Circuit held in Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League ("Raiders')42 that
the NFL violated section 1 by refusing to approve the move of the Oakland
Raiders to Los Angeles. As a result of that decision, many NFL teams have
begun to disregard league rules on relocation. In March 1995, the NFL voted
against the Rams' proposed move from Los Angeles to St. Louis, but one
month later the owners reversed their decision in response to the Rams' threat
of an antitrust suit based on the Raiders case. 43 The Cleveland Browns and
Houston Oilers announced their moves to Baltimore and Nashville,
respectively, before seeking league approval, and the Seattle Seahawks
negotiated a deal to move to the Rose Bowl in violation of a specific NFL
resolution requiring a team to obtain prior permission before relocating to the
Los Angeles area.44
THm WA s. PosT, Nov. 10, 1995, at C1, C4.
39 See Teicher, supra note 35. The NFL teams, for example, share gate receipts,
national television revenue, and revenues from the licensing of team names and logos, but
they do not share revenues from such local sources. See Richard Sandomir, Dollars and
Dallas: League of Their Own?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, § 3, at 1, 13.
40 When the Rams moved from Anaheim to St. Louis, their annual stadium rent declined
from $1.8 million to $250,000. See Richard Aim, The N1FL's Suite Life, DAuAS MORMNG
NEws, Sept. 11, 1995, at D1. The Browns will not be paying any rent at all at their new
stadium in Baltimore. See Stephen Phillips, City Reworked the Numbers as Clock icked
Down, CLEv. PLAINDEALER, Nov. 12, 1995, at A13.
41 See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
42 726 F. 2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Raiders].
43 See Leonard Shapiro, Rams Approved for St. Louis Move, THE WAsH. PosT, Apr.
13, 1995, at D1.
44 See Shapiro, supra note 38; Timothy W. Smith, N.F.L. Shifts: Seahawks Eye Los
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Since NFL teams are now so portable, several teams may compete head-to-
head for the relocation subsidies being offered by a particular city.45 In
November 1995, for example, the Cleveland Browns, Cincinnati Bengals,
Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and Arizona Cardinals were all considering a
relocation to Baltimore. Fearful of losing the financial package offered by
Baltimore, Art Modell, the owner of the Browns, secretly negotiated a deal and
announced the Browns' move to Baltimore even as Cleveland voters were
going to the polls to approve a tax to fund the renovation of Cleveland
Stadium.46
Thus, the single entity theory espoused by a few courts and commentators
bears no relationship to the reality of the modem sports marketplace. Although
they share certain common objectives, the teams in Major League Baseball, the
NFL, the NBA, and the NHL compete with each other on an economic basis.
Indeed, the recent escalation in players' salaries has intensified the owners'
competition to enhance their individual revenue streams. Because sports teams
are separate economic entities, they are capable of conspiring to restrain trade
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The competitive restraints
implemented by professional sports teams, therefore, should be analyzed under
the antitrust laws in the same way as the restraints ancillary to any other joint
ventures among competitors. 47
4. Sports Leagues' Incentive for Anticompetitive Conduct
As competitors, the members of sports leagues have an incentive to
Angeles, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1996, at B9, B12. Seattle's owner voted in favor of that
resolution just one year before the team announced its intention to move to Los Angeles. See
id.
45 Such competition has not been as intense among Major League Baseball owners.
Because of its antitrust exemption, Major League Baseball has been able to control franchise
relocations. Indeed, it has been 24 years since a Major League Baseball team has relocated.
See Mark Maske, Keeping Teams in Place Is Matter of Antitrust, Tim WASH. PosT, Nov. 16,
1995, at B7.
46 Al Davis, the owner of the Oakland Raiders, believes that Mr. Modell used inside
information acquired as a member of the NFL's Finance Committee to beat the other teams to
Baltimore. Tony Grossi, Raiders' Davis Says Move Fails NFL Guidelines, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 18, 1996, at A14.
47 Several courts have characterized sports leagues as joint ventures. See Chicago Prof.
Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1992)
("[W]e treat the NBA as a joint venture."); North Am. Soccer League v. National Football
League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir. 1992) ("NFL is an unincorporated joint venture");
Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The NFL
assumes some of the characteristics of a joint venture.").
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conspire to keep their profits as high as possible. That incentive is greater than
ever in the current economic environment, where the owners' revenue must
keep pace with the increases in players' salaries. In order to maintain their
monopoly leverage, Major League Baseball, the NFL, the NHL, and the NBA
have each refused to expand to accommodate qualified cities' demand for new
franchises. 48 That refusal reveals the extent to which professional sports teams
today are, in fact, economic competitors.
If the members of a sports league did not compete on an economic basis,
they would be perfectly willing to expand the number of franchises to meet the
demand from qualified owners in cities without teams. Such expansion would
benefit the league as a whole by adding to fan interest, enhancing national
television revenues, and increasing receipts from the licensing of league
products. However, because the team owners are in competition with each
other in the market for the sale of franchises, they have an incentive to limit the
number of available teams. Like the members of any other cartel, the owners of
professional sports franchises can charge a higher price for their product if they
limit its output. With a scarcity of franchises, owners can be ensured that they
maintain their monopoly leverage. As long as there are enough qualified cities
without teams, the owners will be able to play cities off against one another in
bidding wars to obtain increasingly generous subsidies.
B. Sports Leagues as Essential Facilities
The courts have characterized as essential facilities any joint ventures which
control a nonduplicable resource to which access is necessary in order to
compete effectively in a relevant market.49 Such joint ventures constitute
48 See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
49 One commentator has described the essential facilities doctrine as follows:
If a group of competitors, acting in concert, operate a common facility and if due to
natural advantage, custom, or restrictions of scale, it is not feasible for excluded
competitors to duplicate the facility, the competitors who operate the facility must give
access to the excluded competitors on reasonable, non-discriminatory terms.
LAWRENcE A. SULLVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTIrRusT 131 (1977). For criticisms
of the essential facilities doctrine, see Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 110 (referring to doctrine
as "a relic of the populism that infected antitrust in earlier eras" which "suggests that weak or
inefficient firms have some right that competitors give them a helping hand"); see also
PHILip AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANT1sTRusr LAw § 9736.1, at 645 (Supp. 1996)
("[Tihe 'essential facility' is just an epithet describing the monopolist's situation: he possesses
something the plaintiff wants. It is not an independent tool of analysis but only a label-a label
that beguiles some commentators and courts into pronouncing a duty to deal .... ").
1996] 1689
OHIO STATE LAW JOURWAL
bottlenecks or gateways through which firms must pass in order to enter a
market. Each of the professional sports leagues should be deemed to be an
essential facility. The leagues constitute a monopoly within each professional
sport. No team can compete in Major League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, or
the NHL without being admitted to one of the leagues, and today it is
impossible for prospective owners to form an effective rival league.
1. The Essential Facilities Doctrine
If a joint venture does not constitute the only means of entry to a particular
market, the venture should be able to adopt any membership rules it wishes
without running afoul of the antitrust laws. In such a case, competition is not
harmed as a result of third parties' exclusion from the venture. Indeed, the
membership restrictions of garden-variety joint ventures may actually promote
competition. As a result of their exclusion from the venture, third parties may
be encouraged to go it alone or to associate with other firms to compete with
the relevant joint venture. A different approach is appropriate, however, for
joint ventures which control access to a resource that is essential to effective
competition in the relevant market. In such cases, a joint venture's exclusionary
membership rules may have a significant anticompetitive effect because they
can completely exclude firms from the relevant market. Under the essential
facilities doctrine, the courts have required that such ventures adopt objective
membership rules that give all qualified parties an opportunity to participate in
the venture on equal terms.
The essential facilities doctrine has a long history in the Supreme Court.
The 1912 Supreme Court case which established the doctrine involved a joint
venture whose unique competitive advantage was conferred by geography. In
United States v. Terminal Railroad Association,50 fourteen railroads owned the
Terminal Railroad Association, which controlled two bridges and a car ferry
that crossed the Mississippi River at St. Louis. No railroad could access St.
Louis, then a major railroad hub, from the east without using the Association's
facilities. The cost for competitors to acquire similar means of access was
prohibitive. The Court required that the Association allow all other railroads to
use the bridges and ferry "upon such just and reasonable terms as shall place
such [railroads] upon a plane of equality in respect of benefits and burdens with
the [current owners]. ''51
In Associated Press v. United States,52 the Court reviewed the membership
rules of the Associated Press ("AP"). The AP competed with United Press and
50 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
51 Id. at 411.
52 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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International News Service in providing wire service reports to newspapers.
Although the AP did not have a monopoly over such news, the Court pointed
out that membership in the AP (which at the time of the suit had 1200 member
newspapers) gave "many newspapers a competitive advantage over their
rivals." 53 The Court voided a provision of the AP's bylaws which allowed a
member newspaper to veto the admission of another newspaper operating in the
same city and field (meaning morning, evening, or Sunday). Once a newspaper
exercised its veto rights, an applicant could only be admitted upon a majority
vote of all the members, and the Court concluded that this provision unduly
restricted competition in the newspaper market.54
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange55 involved the disapproval by the New
York Stock Exchange of a broker-dealer's application for connection to a
private wire system among stock exchange members. The wire permitted
brokers to receive "instantaneously available" market information ahd to trade
with other brokers in the market.56 The Court concluded that "[t]he concerted
action of the Exchange and its members here was, in simple terms, a group
boycott depriving petitioners of a valuable business service which they needed
in order to compete effectively as broker-dealers in the over-the-counter
securities market. "57 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. 58
concerned the refusal of an industry wide standards-setting organization to
provide its "seal of approval" to plaintiff's gas burner. The burner was not
approved despite its apparent safety and efficiency. Without the seal of
approval, the plaintiff was effectively precluded from selling its product in the
market. The Court characterized the association's conduct as an illegal group
boycott.59
Several lower federal courts have adopted the essential facilities doctrine.
53 Id. at 17.
54 See id. at 12-14.
55 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
56 See id. at 348.
57 Id. at 347.
58 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
59 See id. at 658-60. In cases brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the federal
courts have imposed a duty to deal on monopolists which is similar to the courts' essential
facilities approach under section 1. See Otter Trail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973) (holding that electrical power company's refusal to wheel electricity over transmission
lines was illegal because the lines are an essential facility); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v.
Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that ski area violated
section 2 by refusing to cooperate in issuance of multi-mountain ski ticket that constituted
essential facility), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 362 F.
Supp. 1331, 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (requiring owner of airport fuel storage facilities to share
facilities with its competitors), aft'd, 412 U.S. 924 (1973).
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United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc.6° involved the membership rules of a
real estate multiple listing service. Citing Tenninal Railroad Association, Silver,
and Associated Press, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, since access to the
service was critical for real estate brokers, they could not be excluded without
adequate justification. 61 In MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T,62 AT&T had
denied MCI access to AT&T's local telephone circuits, which AT&T then
controlled through its regional Bell companies. The Seventh Circuit relied on
the essential facilities doctrine in requiring AT&T to provide MCI with an
interconnection between MCI's long-distance lines and AT&T's local lines. The
court pointed out that it would not be "economically feasible for MCI to
duplicate Bell's local facilities." 63
A few essential facilities cases have involved professional sports leagues. In
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.,64 the District of Columbia Circuit found that RFK
Stadium in Washington, D.C. was an essential facility. The court concluded
that the prospective owner of a franchise in the American Football League
(which at the time of the suit competed with the NFL) should have been
allowed to share the use of the stadium with the Washington Redskins.65
Similarly, in Fishman v. Estate of Wrz,66 the Seventh Circuit concluded that a
bidder for the Chicago Bulls should have been offered a lease for the Chicago
Stadium because the stadium could not "feasibly be duplicated. "67 In Murray v.
National Football League, the court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint
alleging that the NFL's arbitration policy concerning the sale and purchase of
ownership interests in franchises constituted an essential facility.68
2. Applying the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Sports Leagues
For owners who wish to compete in the relevant sports franchise market,
access to the professional sports leagues is just as critical as the access sought
by the plaintiffs in the essential facilities cases. The sports leagues, no less than
the AP, the NYSE, or AT&T, control all means of entry to the relevant
market. They, therefore, should not be allowed to continue their arbitrary
60 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
61 See id. at 1371.
62 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
63 Id. at 1133.
64 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
65 See id. at 988.
66 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
67 See id. at 539.
68 See Murray v. National Football League, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9108, at *41 (E.D.
Pa. June 26, 1996).
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refusal to admit qualified applicants.
For antitrust purposes, each of the major professional sports constitutes a
separate market, and Major League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL
each hold monopoly power within one of those markets. Products are
considered to be within the same relevant market if consumers would be
reasonably likely to substitute one product for the other.69 One of the most
important tests of interchangeability between two products is the extent to which
sales of one product are responsive to price changes in the other product (called
the "cross-elasticity of demand"). 70 The federal enforcement agencies assume
two products to be in the same market if, in response to a "small but
insignificant" price increase by a monopolist, buyers would switch their
purchases from one product to the other.71
The courts have recognized that, from a consumer's perspective, the type
of sport produced by a particular league is not reasonably interchangeable with
other sports or with other forms of entertainment. In NCAA, the Supreme Court
upheld the District Court's finding that college football broadcasts constituted a
separate market because they were watched by a unique audience for which
advertisers were willing to pay a premium price.72 Similarly, in Raiders, the
Ninth Circuit found that NFL football was the relevant market in which to
analyze the effects of the move of the Raiders from Oakland to Los Angeles.
The court pointed out that NFL football was a unique product with "limited
substitutes from a consumer standpoint." 73 Other courts have also found that
major league hockey74 and NBA basketball75 constitute separate relevant
markets for antitrust purposes.
Major League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL should,
therefore, each be viewed as a separate market. The fans of each sport do not
view other forms of entertainment as reasonable substitutes.76 Fans generally
6 9 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393, 404 (1956).
70 See id. at 400; see also James L. Seal, Market Definition in Antitnt Litigation in the
Sports and Entertainment Industries, 61 ANTxRusT L.J. 737, 737-38 (1993).
71 See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, 41554 (1992).
72 See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 111-12
(1984).
73 Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381,
1393 (9th Cir. 1984).
74 See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462, 471-72 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (finding that major league hockey generated higher ticket
prices, increased television revenue, and higher player salaries than minor league, semi-
professional, or amateur hockey).
75 See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
76 "Indeed, does anyone really contend that a season ticketholder of the Los Angeles
Raiders would accept a showing of Heidi as a reasonable substitute?" Daniel E. Lazaroff, The
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have not switched their allegiance from one professional sport to another when
their favorite sport has raised ticket prices, suffered a strike, or experienced
other difficulties.77 Nor are fans likely to consider minor leagues as comparable
to the four major professional sports leagues. Consider, for example, the $300
million which the people of Maryland were willing to pay in 1995 to replace
the Baltimore Stallions, a Canadian Football League team, with the Cleveland
Browns. 78
Each of the professional sports leagues constitutes a joint venture which
controls the only means of access to the relevant sports market. As members of
such a joint venture, the owners of professional sports franchises collectively
hold monopoly power within each sport.79 Obviously, no team can enter the
relevant market without being admitted to a league. Furthermore, it is
impractical for prospective team owners to form a new league which could
compete with Major League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, or the NHL. The
barriers to entry for new leagues are simply too high.
Player costs in each of the leagues have now escalated to the point where
they consume the largest portion of a team's revenues. 80 A new league would
have to obtain a national television contract in order to afford players who are
comparable in talent to those in an established league. Without a television
contract, for example, a new football league could never compete in the
players' market with the NFL teams, each of which currently receives
approximately $40 million a year as its share of national television revenues.81
Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53
FORDHAM L. REv. 157, 209 (1984).
77 Major League Baseball, for example, did not attract additional fans from professional
football when the NFL experienced difficulties as a result of five franchise relocations which
were completed or announced during ten months in 1994-1995. As one baseball official stated
with regard to the upheaval in the NFL, "I don't think that affects people coming out to this
game or any other sport." See Claire Smith, Baseball Senses Spring Thaw, N.Y. Trmws, Feb.
4, 1996, § 8, at 1, 6.
7 8 See Jay Apperson, Stallions Fans Get a Loud Last Hurrah, Tim BALTimoRE SUN,
Nov. 20, 1995, at Al.
7 9 See Murray v. National Football League, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9108, at *39-41
(E.D. Pa. June 26, 1996) (denying motion to dismisi complaint alleging that NFL owners
conspired to maintain their monopoly power in market for sale and purchase of NFL
franchises); United States Football League v. National Football League, 644 F. Supp. 1040,
1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that NFL monopolized
the market for major league professional football in the United States).
80 See Ross, supra note 4, at 726.
81 See Shapiro, supra note 38. In 1961, in the Sports Broadcasting Act, Congress
granted professional baseball, football, basketball, and hockey an exemption from the antitrust
laws which permitted teams in the leagues to pool their individual rights to telecasts and to sell
those rights as a package. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1994). The effect of this legislation has
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In order to obtain a national television contract, a new league would have to
field teams in most of the major metropolitan areas in the country. 82 However,
many of those cities already have franchises in the relevant sport, and it would
be difficult for a new league to generate sufficient fan support in the same
location for another team (particularly given the likelihood that the new league
initially would be viewed as inferior). In light of these substantial barriers to
entry, it is not surprising that, since World War II, no professional sports
league has survived for more than a few years in competition with an
incumbent league.83
Sports leagues thus possess all the relevant characteristics of the types of
joint ventures which have been deemed to be essential facilities. As monopolies,
the leagues control the resources essential to effective competition in each
professional sports market, and they cannot reasonably be duplicated.
Therefore, under the precedent of the essential facilities cases, the leagues
been to enhance the market power of the current sports leagues in bargaining with the
broadcasting networks, thus further raising barriers to entry for new leagues. See Bauer,
supra note 21, at 274. In 1993, the Fox Network paid the NFL $1.58 billion for the right to
televise NFL games for four years and in 1994 it paid the NHL $155 million for five years of
broadcast rights. See Aim, supra note 32. In 1995, the Fox, NBC, and ESPN networks
entered into a five-year contract with Major League Baseball at a cost of $1.7 billion. See
Smith, supra note 77, at 6.
82 Some commentators have estimated that a new league would require at least eight
viable franchises in order to be an effective competitor with an existing league. See Dick
Patrick, Franchise Moves Might Be the Next Agent of Oange, USA ToDAY, Oct. 21, 1994,
at CIO.
83 The NHL held a monopoly from 1917 until 1971, when the World Hockey
Association was formed. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 465-66 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The World Hockey Association ceased
operations in 1979. The NBA was the only major professional basketball league from 1949 to
1960, when the American Basketball League was formed. That league ceased operations after
only one and a half seasons. See LioNEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTs AND THE LAw 331
(1977). In 1966, the American Basketball Association was formed to compete with the NBA,
but it collapsed in 1976. See American Basketball Ass'n Players Ass'n v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 72 F.R.D.
64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aft'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977). The NFL faced its first competition
in 1946 when the All-American Conference was organized. That league ceased operations in
1949. See SoBEL, supra, at 381. The American Football League was established in 1959, but
by 1966 a merger with the NFL was proposed. See id. at 383-84. See generally American
Football League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962), aj'd, 323
F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963). By 1967 the merger was completed, and the two leagues combined
to form the NFL. The World Football League was formed in 1974, but it went bankrupt and
ceased operations the next year. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 550 F.
Supp. 558, 562 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aft'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
1996]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
should not be permitted to refuse to admit qualified applicants. 84
MI. THE SPORTS LEAGUES' MISUSE OF MEMBERSHIP RESTRICTIONS
A. The Leagues' Refusal to Expand
The owners of sports teams exercise their monopoly power through the
rules promulgated by their respective leagues. League restrictions on player
movement, television broadcasts, and franchise relocation have all been deemed
to constitute illegal uses of the owners' collective market power.85 Team
owners also exercise their monopoly power through restrictions on league
membership. The bylaws of the professional sports teams have been designed to
make expansion difficult and restrict the output of professional sports
franchises. Indeed, the bylaws of Major League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA,
and the NHL do not provide any objective standards for membership at all.
They simply require a vote of three-fourths of all of the owners for the
admission of new teams. 86 These provisions allow the owners to exclude new
entrants for arbitrary or anticompetitive reasons. As the Ninth Circuit pointed
out in the Raiders case, an owner need only muster a small number of votes to
block the league's admission of a potential competitor. 87
The sports leagues have used their restrictive membership rules as a means
of refusing to expand to meet the demand from cities that legitimately could
support new sports franchises. During the last twenty-five years, Major League
Baseball has added only six teams. 88 The NFL, NBA, and NHL have only
84 See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 12 (comparing NFL to essential facilities in United
States v. Terminal Railroad Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), and Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
85 See infra notes 209-19 and accompanying text
86 See National Football League Const. and Bylaws, Art. II, § 3.1(b). Major League
Baseball requires a three-fourths vote of the clubs in the league to which a new team is
admitted, and a majority vote of the clubs in the other league. See Major League Agreement,
Art. V, § 2(b)(3)(i). The NHL Constitution requires a three-fourths vote of all the current
teams for the admission of a new team. See Letter from David Zimmerman, Vice President
and Associate General Counsel, National Hockey League, to Jon J. Goldwood (Jan. 29,
1996) (on file with author). The NBA bylaws require that expansion be approved by three-
fourths of the league's teams. See Letter from Daniel Schoor-Rube, Staff Attorney, National
Basketball Association, to Jon J. Goldwood (Feb. 20, 1996) (on file with author).
87 See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1397 ("[A]n owner need muster only seven friendly votes to prevent three-quarters
approval for the sole reason of preventing another team from entering its market. .... ").
88 Major League Baseball has expanded from twenty-four to thirty teams during the last
twenty-five years. The League added the Seattle Mariners and Toronto Blue Jays in 1977, and
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undergone major expansions when they have felt compelled to eliminate
competition by absorbing teams from rival leagues. 89 The NFL, in fact, has
expanded by only four teams in the twenty-six years since its merger with the
AFL. 90 In its 1995 expansion to Jacksonville and Charlotte, the NFL bypassed
Baltimore and St. Louis, both of which have proven they could support NFL
teams and which were prepared to offer lucrative stadium deals for an
expansion team. By ignoring St. Louis and Baltimore, the NFL insured that
those cities would offer generous incentives to lure existing teams, thus
increasing the leverage of all the NFL owners in their current communities. 91
None of the professional sports leagues is expected to expand again in the near
future,92 despite the fact that several more cities could support franchises in
the Colorado Rockies and Florida Marlins in 1993. See Patrick, supra note 80. In March
1995, the owners agreed to add the Arizona Diamondbacks and Tampa Bay Devil Rays, to
begin play in 1998. See Murray Chass, Usery Lectures the Owners as They Add Two Teams,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 10, 1995, at B12.
89 In 1979, the World Hockey Association, a rival league to the NHL, ceased
operations, and its franchises in Hartford, Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Vancouver were
admitted to the NHL. See SOBEL, supra note 83, at 393. In 1976, American Basketball
Association teams in Indiana, San Antonio, Denver, and New York received NBA franchises,
and the ABA disbanded as a rival to the NBA. See American Basketball Ass'n Players' Ass'n
v. National Basketball Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 594, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af4'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d
Cir. 1977). The All-America Conference, a rival league to the NFL in the 1940s, ceased its
operations in 1949, when Cleveland, San Francisco, and Baltimore were given NFL
franchises. In 1966, Congress granted a statutory exemption for the merger of the NFL and
the American Football League. See Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 6(b)(1), 80
Stat. 1508, 1515 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994)). In 1970, the two leagues
combined to form the NFL.
90 The NFL has expanded from twenty-six to thirty teams during the last twenty-five
years, adding Tampa Bay and Seattle in 1976 and Carolina and Jacksonville in 1995. See
Patrick, supra note 82. The NBA has added eleven teams since 1970, and the NHL has added
fifteen teams. See id. Although they have expanded to a greater extent than the NFL or Major
League Baseball, the NBA and NHL have not yet met the demand for franchises from
qualified cities. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
91 In that connection, it is interesting to note that Art Modell, the owner of the Cleveland
Browns, who later announced a move of his team to Baltimore, was reportedly very vocal in
his opposition to the NFL granting an expansion franchise to Baltimore. See Thomas George,
Modell Joins Newest Game in Football, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1995, at B9.
92 Rod Fort, a Washington State University economics professor, recently concluded
that near-term expansion of any of the major sports leagues is unlikely. See Patrick, supra
note 82. In February 1996, the NFL agreed to grant Cleveland an expansion team by 1999,
but only if the city constructed a new stadium and if the NFL was unable to move an existing
team to Cleveland prior to 1999. See Stephen Koff, et. al, City, NL Strike a Deal, CLEv.
PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 9, 1996, at Al, A18.
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each of the leagues. 93
By keeping the supply of franchises artificially low, the owners have been
able to assure themselves of significant profits irrespective of the quality of their
product. The owners are guaranteed that, whenever a team is for sale, several
potential buyers will drive up the price by competing for the rare opportunity to
own a sports franchise. If an owner wishes to retain control of a team, he or she
can use the threat of a move to another city to obtain various subsidies from
local governments. 94 In the unusual cases in which the owners do approve
expansion, they have been able to exact enormous fees from the new franchise
owners. For example, Gene Autry paid a $2.45 million expansion fee to the
American League in 1960 for the California Angels. 95 In 1995, the owners of
the Arizona Diamondbacks and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, which will begin
play in 1998, agreed to pay the League a $155 million fee, representing a more
than sixty-fold increase in thirty-five years. 96
The antitrust laws have consistently been deemed to prohibit conduct such
as the owners' refusal to allow a reasonable expansion of their leagues. An
antitrust commentator has pointed out that "practices that reduce... output and
thus raise.., price diminish consumer welfare and are therefore unlawful. " 97
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the antitrust laws preclude
agreements among joint venture members to restrict the output of their venture.
In NCAA, the Court characterized price and output restraints as classic
examples of the types of restraints that the Sherman Act was intended to
93 For a discussion of the studies indicating the types of cities that could support
expansion teams, see infra note 203 and accompanying text.
94 "Mhe NFL appears to be holding down the number of franchises and provoking
bidding wars between cities trying to lure existing teams, often with promises of expensive,
taxpayer-funded stadiums." Shapiro, supra note 38. As Robert Baade, an economist
specializing in sports leagues, commented with respect to the recent move of the Cleveland
Browns to Baltimore: "They have limited the supply of franchises so the values are very high;
[tihe Browns value jumps significantly with this move, and the message it sends to other cities
inflates the value of the other teams." Id. Andrew Zimbalist, an economics professor at Smith
College, has pointed out that, for owners, "[h]aving demand for franchises exceed supply is
always in their interest, so they can blackmail the cities they're in." Patrick, supra note 82.
95 See Who's Who of Owners, CL.V. PLAN DEALER, Aug. 21, 1994, at D6.
96 See Chass, supra note 88. Franchise fees in the other leagues have also escalated
significantly. The owners of the Minnesota Vikings paid the NFL a $1 million expansion fee
in 1961, while the owners of the Carolina Panthers and Jacksonville Jaguars each paid $140
million in 1995. See Patrick, supra note 82. The owners of the Chicago Bulls paid the NBA a
$1.25 million fee in 1966, while the owners of the Toronto Raptors and Vancouver Grizzlies
each paid $125 million in 1995. See id. In the NHL, the Oakland Seals paid a $2 million
expansion fee in 1967, and the Florida Panthers and Anaheim Mighty Ducks each paid a $50
million fee in 1993. See id.
97 Jacobs, supra note 31, at 49.
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prohibit. 98 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,99 the Court found that practices
"tend[ing] to restrict competition and [to] decrease output" were a threat to "the
proper operation of our predominantly free-market economy." 100
B. Consequences of the Sports Leagues' Refusal to Expand
Consumers have been harmed significantly as a result of the scarcity of
franchises maintained by the professional sports leagues. As in the case of any
other monopoly, the prices have risen, while the quality of the relevant product
has declined.
In an open market, the owners of sports teams would have an incentive to
provide their customers with the best possible product at the lowest possible
price. However, as long as they maintain a limited supply of franchises, owners
will be less compelled to manage their teams efficiently. The owners need not
fear market retribution if they fail to control their costs or to field a quality
team. Owners know that, in a monopoly market, fans have no choice but to
endure the type of team that is put on the field. Owners have little incentive to
control escalating players' salaries because they can pass such costs on to local
fans and taxpayers who have no alternative in the relevant sports
marketplace. 10
Because the number of cities able to support teams greatly exceeds the
number of available franchises, even the most mediocre teams can play cities
off against one other.1°2 Such teams can obtain a windfall by moving to a new
98 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107-08 (1984).
99 441 U.S. 1 (1978).
100 Id. at 19-20.
101 As with other abuses of monopoly power, fans are the primary victims of inefficient
management. Loyal fans of local teams, having no marketplace alternative to which they
can turn, have little choice but to endure whatever management chooses to do. The
dilemma facing proud fans who must suffer or cease patronizing teams they love is
precisely the dilemma that competition, as enforced through antitrust policy, is designed
to avoid.
Ross, supra note 4, at 702.
1o2 In the NFL, for example, four teams concluded or announced moves during 1995.
The Rams moved from Los Angeles to St. Louis in a deal valued at $320 million. See
Teicher, supra note 35, at Al. The Raiders decided to move from Los Angeles after Oakland
offered $223 million in subsidies. See Peter Fimrite, Why Raiders Are a Bargain for Oakland,
S.F. CHRON., Sept. 5, 1995, at Al, A6. The Browns agreed to move from Cleveland to
Baltimore for $290 million, see Gail Kerr & Jeff Legwold, The Deal: No New Tares, THm
TENNEssEAN, Oct. 6, 1995, at Al, and the Oilers announced a move from Houston to
Nashville valued at $320 million, see John Helyar, A Long Bomb, WAIL ST. J., Nov. 21,
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city or simply threatening to do so. The Cleveland Browns, Houston Oilers,
and Los Angeles Rams, for example, had a combined record of 101 wins and
139 losses during the last five years, 103 but they were each able to receive
hundreds of millions of dollars in benefits by agreeing to move to Baltimore,
Nashville, and St. Louis.04 When such rewards are available for the most
poorly managed teams, it is inevitable that the overall quality of teams in a
league will decline over time.
In addition to reducing quality, the artificial scarcity of teams has raised
prices in the sports franchise markets. Prices have increased in several different
ways, both directly and indirectly, as a result of the leagues' refusal to expand
to accommodate the demand for new franchises. Local governments have been
forced to provide the owners with subsidies for the construction of new
stadiums, thus increasing the tax burden on their citizens. Fans have had to pay
more for the privilege of attending games in new stadiums. The subsidies from
fans and taxpayers have increased the value of sports franchises, forcing new
owners to pay more to acquire teams.
In recent years, stadium economics have accelerated the owners' demands
for subsidies from fans and taxpayers. Indeed, the potential revenues from new
stadiums are now so great that any professional sports franchise without a new
facility considers itself economically inferior to its competitors. Leigh
Steinberg, a players' agent, has concluded that any team with a stadium that is
more than five years old is a candidate to relocate to obtain a new facility. 105
Owners believe such stadiums are obsolete because they lack the amenity of
luxury suites.106 Revenue from suites is particularly attractive to an owner
because, under the bylaws of each of the major sports leagues, it need not be
shared with other teams.107 The revenues accruing to owners from suites can be
1995, at Al. In the NHL, the Winnipeg Jets have moved to Phoenix, the Nordiques left
Quebec for Denver, and the Edmonton Oilers and Florida Panthers are threatening to
relocate. See Richard Sandomir, New Option: Take the Team and Run, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14,
1996, at B19, B20.
103 See NATIONAL FOomALL LEAGuE OFmicAL 1995 REcoRD AND FAcr BOOK 269-71
(1995).
104 See supra note 102.
105 See Sandomir, supra note 102, at 19, 20.
106 Michael Ziets, a sports industry consultant, has concluded that, "Without enough
skyboxes, a stadium is considered practically obsolete." See Randall Lane, Bread and
Circuses, FoRBEs, June 6, 1994, at 62. The Orlando Magic, for example, is requesting a new
arena with luxury suites, despite the fact that the Orlando Arena is only five years old. See id.
107 See Teicher, supra note 35. The NFL, for example, shares revenue from national
television advertising and the licensing of team names and logos. Gate receipts are also
shared, with 60% going to the home team and 40% to the away team. See Jacobs, supra note
31, at 31 n.27. Local stadium revenues from parking, concessions, advertising, and luxury
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enormous. Luxury seating at sports stadiums currently generates $400 million a
year in revenues in the four major sports, representing 21% of the amount
brought in by all ticket sales.10 8 It is therefore not surprising that more than half
of the ninety-nine professional sports teams in the United States have either just
moved into a new stadium or have plans to build one.10 9
Instead of improving their public schools, health care, or housing, cities are
constructing stadiums, ballparks, and arenas in order to attract or retain sports
teams. 110 Cities have been willing to guarantee team owners a broad range of
subsidies, including tax abatement, free utilities, tax-supported stadium
financing, and outright cash grants, and these subsidies have increased
significantly in recent years.11' In 1971, local stadium subsidies totaled
approximately $8 million. 112 A recent study concluded that subsidies for
professional sports teams currently drain $500 million annually from state and
local governments. 113 Since 1992, cities have spent more than $1 billion to
build or renovate stadiums, and they are expected to spend another $6 billion in
the next three years. 114
The latest development in stadium financing permits owners to obtain
subsidies directly from the fans. The "personal seat license" ("PSL") is an
advance fee paid by fans for the right to purchase season tickets. Some owners
have charged more than $5000 for a single PSL.115 PSLs are helping to fund
seating, however, are not shared. See Teicher, supra note 35.108 See Valerie Lister, Owners Fill Up on Rising Revenues from Lwauy Suites, USA
TODAY, Oct. 21, 1994, at C10.
109 See Lane, supra note 106.
110 Some have questioned the return on such investment. As Lake Forest College
economist Robert Baade has pointed out: "If you want to subsidize an industry, subsidize an
industry that's generating jobs that are high skill and high wage and not seasonal in nature..
. ." Lane, supra note 106, at 64. In January 1996, several Maryland legislators questioned the
advisability of spending approximately $200 million to build a new stadium for the Browns.
One legislator stated, "This does not make sense. I'd rather be building schools and roads and
bridges." Tom Stuckey, Browns Stadium Faces Challenges in Maryland, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 12, 1996, at A14.
111 See Lane, supra note 106, at 62-63; Ross, supra note 4, at 649. Stadium
construction costs have been borne by federal as well as local taxpayers. Many of the new
stadiums are being financed with bonds whose interest is exempt from federal taxes. The
Browns' new stadium in Baltimore, for example, will cost the federal Treasury $36 million in
revenues. See Commissioner Rips Jones, supra note 36.
112 See Ross, supra note 4, at 649.
113 See Lane, supra note 106, at 63-64.
114 See Aim, supra note 32. Cincinnati alone plans to spend $540 million to build
separate stadiums for its football and baseball teams. See id.
115 The Carolina Panthers recently charged up to $5400 for their PSLs. See Fimrite,
supra note 102, at A6.
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new or renovated stadiums in Oakland, St. Louis, Charlotte, Nashville, and
Baltimore, which expect to raise a collective $450 million from their sale. 116 If
the professional sports leagues had not so carefully controlled their output of
franchises, it is doubtful that fans would be willing to pay such sums simply for
the privilege of buying a season ticket in a new stadium. 117
In a competitive market, new stadiums would be built in response to
demand from fans for better facilities. However, in the monopoly market of
professional sports leagues, the usual laws of supply and demand have been
turned on their head. It is not the welfare of consumers, but that of the team
owners, which prevails. The new stadiums are not being constructed because
fans are demanding luxury seating, but because the owners want to enhance
their profits. Fans in most cities are perfectly content with the stadiums which
the owners are attempting to replace. Nevertheless, because of the scarcity of
franchises, local fans feel compelled to subsidize new stadiums in order to
prevent their teams from relocating. The mere threat of moving to another city
is now so credible that cities are willing to meet owners' demands for new
stadiums. 118 In this era of franchise free agency, cities must take such threats
seriously. Even strong local support no longer guarantees that a team will
remain in a particular city. 119 Thus the sports leagues' monopoly leverage has
created a perverse situation in which the fans must satisfy the owners instead of
116 See id.; Sandomir, supra note 102.
117 Bob Costas, an NBC sports commentator, describes the trend toward PSL sales as
"unseemly at its best, extortion at its worst." Id. at 4.
118 In 1988, the State of Illinois agreed to build a $135 million stadium for the Chicago
White Sox after they threatened to move to St. Petersburg. See Lane, supra note 106, at 62-
63. The Minnesota legislature agreed to an $80 million takeover of the arena for the NBA's
Minnesota Timberwolves after they proposed a move from Minneapolis. See id. at 63. The
City of Edmonton agreed to improve the terms of the lease for the NHL's Oilers after they
threatened to move. See Tim Crothers, The Shakedown, SPORTs ILLUSrEATED, June 19,
1995, at 78, 80. The City of Philadelphia gave the Eagles a more favorable lease in order to
avoid their move to Phoenix. See Ross, supra note 4, at 650-51. Senator Frank Lautenberg
explained that the scarcity of football teams caused the City's action: "If there was a team
already in Phoenix, could the owner have held a gun to Philadelphia's head and to the heads
of its many fans on both sides of the Delaware? I think not." Professional Sports Community
Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 259 and S. 287 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1985).
119 The Cleveland Browns, for example, agreed to move to Baltimore in November
1995, despite the fact that they attracted an average of approximately 70,000 fans per game
for decades, had the strongest local ratings for their telecasts of any NFL team in the country,
and sold more NFL-licensed products than any team other than the Dallas Cowboys. See
Dave Anderson, Heroes and Villains, Big and Small, N.Y. TWEs, Dec. 31, 1995, § 8, at 1;
Teicher, supra note 35.
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vice versa.120
The subsidies from fans and local governments for the construction of new
stadiums have substantially increased the value of sports franchises. Indeed, the
greatest determinant of franchise value is no longer the size of the market in
which a team is located, but the stadium deal which it is able to negotiate. 121
The annual revenue streams to individual teams from new stadiums generally
range from $15 to $25 million, and a few teams expect to achieve $35 to $40
million in annual revenues. 122 Such revenues can significantly inflate a team's
market value. Art Modell bought the Cleveland Browns for $4 million in 1961.
With the Browns' new stadium in Baltimore, estimates of the team's worth are
now close to $200 million.123 The Baltimore Orioles sold for $70 million in
1989. In 1990 the State of Maryland built the Camden Yards stadium for the
Orioles, and in 1994 the owners of the team sold it for $173 million,
representing an appreciation of 250% in four years. 124 Because of the new
stadium, the Orioles franchise currently has a greater value than baseball teams
120 Jerry Jones, the owner of the Dallas Cowboys, has provided a frank description of
the NFL owners' monopoly leverage: "We all regret the situation in Cleveland, the team
moving from Cleveland. But that exercise could well have us a new stadium in Baltimore,
and a new stadium in Cleveland that ultimately will have an NFL team in it." Bud Shaw,
Tagliabue Presides over NFL Thievery, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 30, 1996, at Dl. Indeed,
as a result of the Browns' move to Baltimore, the NFL was successful in obtaining new
stadiums in both cities. See Bud Shaw, NFL Shifts Gears for Seattle Fans, CLEv. PLAIN
DEALER, Feb. 17, 1996, at Dl.
121 Stadium subsidies have created a new division among teams in professional sports.
Paul Tagliabue, the Commissioner of the NFL, recently stated: "there is a gap ... between
the have and the have nots, which is being accelerated ... ." Shapiro, supra note 38, at C4.
Traditionally, the determining factor between the haves and the have-nots has been market
size. However, teams with new stadiums now have the upper hand, even if they are located in
small markets. Thus, the Los Angeles Rams and Los Angeles Raiders were willing to move,
respectively, from the nation's second-largest market to St. Louis, the number twenty market,
and Oakland, which splits the number five market with the San Francisco 49ers; the
Cleveland Browns announced a move from the number thirteen market to Baltimore, the
twenty-third largest market; and the Houston Oilers agreed to move from the eleventh largest
market to the thirty-third largest in Nashville. See id. at C4; Helyar, supra note 102; see also
Shapiro, supra note 38.
122 See Ray Waddell, New Venues for Sports to Cost over $5 Billion, AMUSEMdENT
Bus., Vol. 107, No. 31, July 31, 1995, at 3. The Dallas Cowboys receive $37 million in
annual stadium revenues, see Michael K. Ozanian, Suite Deals, FIN. WoRLD, May 9, 1995,
at 42, 50, and the Detroit Tigers expect to receive $40 million annually from a planned new
stadium, see Alm, supra note 32.
123 Shapiro, supra note 38.
124 Lane, supra note 106, at 63.
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in larger markets, including the New York Mets and Boston Red Sox. 125
The artificial scarcity of franchises maintained by the professional sports
leagues has created a vicious cycle which is harmful to the interests of
American consumers. Team owners have sufficient leverage to force fans and
local governments to pay for new stadiums which substantially enhance a
team's revenues. Such revenues increase a team's market value, forcing
subsequent owners to pay more to acquire the team. With the increased debt
load incurred to buy a team, a new owner has an even greater need for
subsidies from fans and taxpayers. And so the cycle of increasing costs and
subsidies continues.
This cycle would be broken if the leagues were compelled to grant
franchises to qualified owners in cities that could support a professional sports
team. 126 Increased competition from additional franchises would bring the
discipline of the free market to sports leagues. Since all cities of sufficient size
would be entitled to a franchise, owners could no longer play cities off against
one another. Instead of trying to woo away an existing franchise, the have-not
cities would be more likely to seek an expansion team, which would have local
ownership and its own local identity. An owner therefore could not use the
threat of relocation as a way to obtain excessive subsidies from a host city.
Since owners could not escape their problems simply by moving to another
city, they would have a greater incentive to control costs and manage their
teams efficiently. The prices of franchises would fall to a more reasonable level
as supply became more in line with demand, and the enormous subsidies
currently being offered by cities to sports teams would abate.
IV. A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE MEMBERSHIP
RESTRICTIONS OF SPORTS LEAGUES
The relevant antitrust issue for sports leagues, as for most other types of
joint ventures, is not the legality of the venture itself but of any ancillary
restraints on competition agreed to by its members. 127 Joint venture
12 5 See Ozanian, supra note 122, at 42. It has been estimated that the value of the Texas
Rangers' franchise increased by $54 million after the completion of a new ballpark in
Arlington, Texas. See Aim, supra note 32.
12 6 Instead of compelled expansion, one commentator has proposed that the economic
problems resulting from the monopoly power of sports leagues would be better resolved by
breaking up the current leagues into rival leagues. See Ross, supra note 4, at 646, 748-54.
127 Although one commentator has argued that the major professional sports leagues
should be broken up, see id., the prevailing view is that sports leagues do not violate the
antitrust laws simply because they possess monopoly power. As Robert Bork has stated,
"When a league of professional lacrosse teams is formed, it would be pointless to declare
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membership restrictions constitute a type of ancillary restraint. They are, in
effect, a joint refusal by the members of the venture to deal with third parties.
By integrating the ancillary restraints and essential facility doctrines, the
courts can fashion an effective legal framework for analyzing the membership
rules of sports leagues. Such an approach would put an end to the artificial
scarcity of professional sports franchises. The essential facilities doctrine
requires that the leagues not be given a free hand in implementing membership
rules. Because league membership is a sine qua non for participation in the
major professional sports, the leagues should not be permitted arbitrarily to
deny admission to qualified applicants. Rather, they should be required to
demonstrate a valid efficiency justification for any of their restrictions on
membership.
The courts should not, however, require sports leagues to forego all
membership restrictions. As legitimate joint ventures, the leagues should be
permitted to enforce reasonable membership rules which are ancillary to their
efficiency objectives. The ancillary restraints doctrine, which was first set forth
in the earliest days of antitrust analysis, provides an effective basis for
determining which membership rules are justified by a league's efficiency
objectives. Under an ancillary restraints approach, membership rules would be
upheld if they were no broader than required to promote such objectives.
However, membership rules would be precluded if they were more restrictive
than necessary to preserve a league's efficiency. 128
Traditionally, the federal courts have treated harshly any agreements
among competitors not to deal with third parties, characterizing them as "per
se" illegal group boycotts. 129 Under the per se rule, the courts have refused to
their cooperation illegal on the ground that there are no other professional lacrosse teams."
BORK, supra note 24, at 278. In order to commit an antitrust violation, the members of sports
leagues must agree to use their monopoly power in some anticompetitive manner which is not
justified by the legitimate efficiencies which the leagues are designed to achieve.
12 8 As Judge Bork recognized in Rothery, to be ancillary, a restraint "must be related to
the efficiency sought to be achieved." Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,
792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629
F.2d 1351, 1375 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[The requirements of the rules themselves must be
reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the legitimate goals [of the joint venture] and
narrowly tailored to that end.").
12 9 The term "group boycott" has been used rather loosely in antitrust, and it can apply
to any agreement by a group of competitors to cease doing business with suppliers,
customers, or other competitors for some anticompetitive purpose. For examples of per se
illegal group boycotts, see United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)
(Chevrolet dealers convinced General Motors to pressure other retailers not to deal with
discounters); Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (appliance
dealer induced manufacturers and wholesalers to sell only at discriminatory prices to
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consider any justifications offered by defendants for conduct considered to be
inherently anticompetitive. Thus, horizontal price fixing and territorial
allocations, as well as group boycotts, have been found to be illegal on their
face without any consideration of the potential efficiencies associated with such
conduct. 130 By contrast, the courts have applied a more permissive "rule of
reason" standard to other types of section 1 conduct. Under the rule of reason,
the courts have been willing to consider all the economic circumstances
surrounding a restraint before condemning it, including a defendant's efficiency
justifications. 131
There is some precedent for viewing the membership rules of essential
facilities as per se illegal group boycotts. In Silver132 and Radiant Burners 33
the Supreme Court applied the per se rule to the joint venture membership
restrictions at issue. 134 In Northwest Wholesale Stationers' v. Pacific Stationery
& Printing Co., 135 the Court implied in dicta that the membership rules of
essential facilities should be per se illegal. The Court stated that a per se
approach is appropriate when a joint venture possesses "market power or
exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition. " 13 6 In
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 137 the Seventh Circuit cited Northwest Wholesale as
authority for the per se illegality of the refusal by the owner of the Chicago
Stadium to lease the facility to the firm bidding to purchase the Chicago
Bulls. 138
Under a per se approach, sports leagues would not have any opportunity to
prove their justifications for membership rules. Such an approach, however, is
too harsh for restrictions implemented by joint ventures, such as sports leagues,
which require certain competitive restraints in order to make their products
competing dealers); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group of
fashion designers agreed not to deal with retailers who copied designs of group members).
130 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Co. Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 347 (1982)
("We have not wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule against price fixing."); United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (per se illegality of horizontal territorial
allocation); see supra note 129 (per se illegality of group boycotts).131 See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918) (listing several
factors a court should consider before invoking antitrust sanctions); see also Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977) (citing the statement of the rule of reason
in Chicago Board of Trade).
132 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1962).
133 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1980).
134 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
135 472 U.S. 284 (1984).
136 Id. at 296.
137 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
138 See id. at 541.
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available at all. The leagues should be given a chance to demonstrate the
reasonableness of their membership limitations. The ancillary restraints doctrine
provides a framework for a rule of reason evaluation of the leagues' arguments.
The ancillary restraints doctrine originated in the 1898 case, United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 139 In that case, Judge (later Chief Justice and
President) Taft concluded that a restraint of trade should be permissible when it
was "ancillary to the main purpose of a [lawful] contract [and is] reasonably
adopted and limited to the necessary protection of a party in the carrying out of
such purpose." 140 Under Judge Taft's approach, restrictions necessary to
promote the procompetitive purposes of an underlying joint venture would be
allowed; however, "naked" restraints unrelated to such purposes would be
void.141
Other courts were slow to adopt the Addyston Pipe approach. Indeed, for
nearly eighty years the doctrine was disregarded by the federal judiciary. In the
last fifteen years, however, the ancillary restraints doctrine has re-emerged, as
the federal courts have adopted a more sophisticated economic approach to
antitrust analysis. 142
Although the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly adopted the ancillary
restraints doctrine, certain of its recent decisions appear to follow such an
approach implicitly. In BMI v. CBS,143 the Court considered the legality of a
price-fixing arrangement among joint venture partners. BMI was an association
of 20,000 musical composers. The composers granted to BMI the right to give
a blanket copyright license, for a fixed fee, to those who wanted to play their
music. 44 Conceding that the arrangement constituted price-fixing "in the literal
139 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
140 Id. at 283.
141 See Roberts, supra note 10, at 1005; Bork, supra note 24, at 27 ("To be ancillary,
and hence lawful, an agreement eliminating competition must be subordinate and collateral to
a separate, legitimate transaction. The ancillary restraint is subordinate and collateral in the
sense that it makes the main transaction more effective in accomplishing legitimate
purposes.").
142 See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984); Broadcast Music v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The re-emergence of the ancillary
restraints doctrine has coincided with the courts' increased preference for a rule of reason
over a per se approach. The rule of reason has now become the dominant approach to section
1 conduct, because it allows courts to consider all of the relevant economic effects of such
conduct. See Piraino, supra note 16, at 1757-60; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per
Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitnst Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 693-700
(1991).
143 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
144 See id. at 5.
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sense," 145 the Supreme Court nevertheless held that the blanket license should
be analyzed under the rule of reason because of its procompetitive aspects. The
Court relied on the fact that the blanket license was, in effect, a new product 46
and that its price-fixing aspects were integral to the effective marketing of the
product.147
Like the association of musical composers in BMI, sports leagues produce a
product that could not exist in the absence of cooperation among joint venture
partners. Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that leagues should have the
opportunity to demonstrate that certain restrictions on competition are necessary
for their effectiveness. In NCAA, the Supreme Court considered the legality of
the NCAA's limitations on the number of times each of its member schools
could appear on television. 148 The Court acknowledged that these limitations
constituted restrictions on output that "are ordinarily condemned" as per se
illegal. 149 However, the Court found that certain restraints on competition are
required for the very existence of intercollegiate football. 150 Therefore the
Court used the rule of reason rather than a per se approach to analyze the
broadcast restrictions. 151
Many of the lower federal courts have concluded that these recent Supreme
Court cases require that the ancillary restraints doctrine be applied to all joint
ventures. 152 In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,153 Judge
145 See id. at 8.
146 "The blanket license is composed of the individual compositions plus the aggregating
-service. Here, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to some extent, a
different product." Id. at 21.
147 "Mhe agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all." Id. at 23.
148 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
14 9 See id. at 100.
150 See id. at 100-01.
151 See id. at 104-20. The lower federal courts have also generally used the rule of
reason to analyze the competitive restraints of sports leagues. See, e.g., North Am. Soccer
League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying rule of reason
to ban on cross-ownership of sports franchises); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (using rule of reason to analyze NFL draft).
152 See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994)
(permitting membership restrictions of Visa credit card system on grounds they were
"reasonably related to Visa USA's operation and no broader than necessary to effectuate the
association's business"); National Bancard Corp. v. VISA USA, Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 605
(11th Cir. 1986) (upholding "interchange fee" among banks in credit card system on grounds
fee helped insure universal acceptance of card); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc.,
776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying rule of reason to noncompetition agreement between
neighboring stores because agreement was necessary for effectiveness of their cooperative
marketing program); see also Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding, in dicta, that NFL restrictions on team
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Bork found that the Supreme Court had implicitly adopted the ancillary
restraints doctrine in its recent cases. He even concluded that the Court's
decisions constituted a "statement of the law of ancillary restraints... so close
to that of Addyston Pipe & Steel as to be virtually indistinguishable."
154
The recent revival of the ancillary restraints doctrine in the federal courts
leaves little doubt that the approach should be used to analyze the membership
rules of sports leagues. Under an ancillary restraints approach, the courts would
consider the relationship between the leagues' membership restrictions and their
efficiency objectives. The leagues would be permitted to adopt membership
rules that were reasonably tailored to achieve such legitimate objectives as
competitive balance, fan interest, and scheduling efficiency. However, the
leagues would not be allowed to enforce restrictions on membership if they
could accomplish the same objectives through less restrictive means. 155
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT MEMBERSIP RULES OF SPORTS
LEAGUES
A. Allocating the Burden of Proof
The courts are justified in placing the burden on sports leagues to prove
that their membership restrictions should be upheld as ancillary restraints. Such
a shifting of the burden of proof is fair because the leagues themselves are in
the best position to demonstrate which membership rules are necessary to insure
their efficiency. Furthermore, unreasonable restrictions on membership by
essential facilities such as sports leagues have serious anticompetitive effects.
Since limitations on league expansion reduce the quality of team management
and raise the prices paid by consumers, 156 the leagues should have the burden
movement could withstand antitrust scrutiny if they were "closely tailored to serve the needs
inherent in producing the NFL product. .. .
153 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
154 Id. at 229.
155 Some lower federal courts have held that restraints implemented by sports leagues
should not be permitted when the same objectives could be accomplished by less restrictive
means. See, e.g., Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462, 504 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (pointing out that courts should require evidence that
legitimate objectives of restraints on movement of players could not be "obtained by devices
with less anti-competitive potential") (citing Note, The Super Bowl and the Sherman Act:
Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARv. L. REv. 418, 422 (1967) [hereinafter
Super Bowl]).156 For a description of the adverse consequences of the sports leagues' misuse of their
monopoly power, see supra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
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of justifying such limitations.
Placing such a burden on the leagues is consistent with recent cases in
which the Supreme Court has required defendants to affirmatively prove their
justification for facially anticompetitive conduct. In NCAA, the Court
emphasized that the NCAA's restrictions on television broadcasts raised prices
and restricted output and concluded that "these hallmarks of anticompetitive
behavior place upon ... [the NCAA] a heavy burden of establishing an
affirmative defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from
the operations of a free market." 157 In FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists,158 a group of dentists conspired to withhold x-rays from insurance
companies evaluating benefit claims. The Court pointed out that the dentists had
refused to provide consumers with a product they desired. Such conduct could
not be sustained under the rule of reason absent the defendants' proof of "some
countervailing procompetitive virtue." 159 These cases require that, in order to
sustain their restrictions on membership, the professional sports leagues
demonstrate that their conduct promoted a legitimate league objective. 160
B. The Overbreadth of the Leagues' Current Rules
Major League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL cannot meet the
burden of proving the reasonableness of their current membership rules. The
rules are too broad to withstand antitrust scrutiny. Each league requires a vote
of three-fourths of the current owners to approve expansion. 161 To preserve
their efficiency, it is not necessary for the leagues to enforce such a broad
prohibition on the admission of new teams. Less restrictive alternatives are
available.
In several cases, the courts have precluded the enforcement of membership
rules which were no less broad than those of the major professional sports
leagues. In Associated Press, the Supreme Court voided an AP bylaw that
required a majority vote of the AP members for the admission of a newspaper
157 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984).
158 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
159 Id. at 459.
160 The federal antitrust enforcement agencies have also recognized the burden that
network joint ventures must meet in order to sustain membership restrictions. See
Anticipating the 21st Centutry: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global
Marketplace, A Report by the Federal Trade Commission Staff (May, 1996), 70 BNA Anti.
& Trade Reg. Rep., No. 1765 (June 6, 1996), at S-92 ("We believe that when demand-side
scale economics render effective intersystem competition outside a network joint venture less
viable, heightened scrutiny of membership denials is warranted.").
161 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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that competed with a current member.162 Similarly, in Realty Multi-List, the
Fifth Circuit prohibited a real estate multiple listing service from enforcing
subjective membership requirements, including rules that brokers have a
"favorable credit report and business reputation." 163 Finally, in Blalock v.
LPGA,164 the court overturned a golf association's "unfettered, subjective
discretion" to suspend a player for one year without any legitimate reason.165
There is no legitimate objective of the professional sports leagues that could
not be accomplished by less restrictive membership rules than those currently in
existence. None of the efficiencies for which the leagues are designed-
preserving competitive balance, maintaining an efficient capacity, or protecting
the investment of individual team owners-requires that expansion be limited to
those owners who can muster a three-fourths majority in favor of their
admission.
1. The Competitive Balance Argument
The maintenance of competitive balance is one of the most important
objectives of professional sports leagues. In order to retain fan interest, the
leagues must insure that, over a period of time, each team has a reasonable
opportunity to contend for the championship of a particular sport. Competitive
balance requires that each team be competently managed and have a
comparable ability to obtain the most talented players. Revenue sharing, salary
caps, the draft of amateur players, and restrictions on player mobility are
examples of restraints that have been designed by leagues to help ensure
competitive balance.
The current membership restrictions of the professional sports leagues are
not justified by the need for competitive balance. One of the principal
arguments against the expansion of sports leagues is the potential lack of
"sufficient player talent to produce a proper caliber of play in expanded
leagues."' 66 However, player talent can be distributed over a larger number of
teams just as evenly as it is distributed over the current teams in each of the
leagues. Furthermore, fan enjoyment is more a function of the relative parity
among teams than of the average quality of play. Indeed, overall attendance in
the professional sports leagues has increased after each expansion, despite the
dilution of talent that occurs at such times. 16 7
162 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1944).
163 United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1380-82 (5th Cir. 1980).
164 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
165 See id. at 1265.
166 Ross, supra note 4, at 664.
167 See id. at 664-65; Super Bowl, supra note 155, at 427.
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Another argument against league expansion is its supposed reduction in the
percentage of teams with a chance to win a championship. However, the
presence of a larger number of teams does not mean that the excitement of
championship races will be diminished. Leagues can be divided into additional
conferences, giving more teams a chance to compete for a conference
championship. 168
The managerial competence of individual teams may affect a league's
competitive balance. If leagues were forced to admit owners who were not
capable of putting an effective team on the field, games would be less
interesting to fans and the image of the entire league would suffer. Managerial
competence, however, does not have to be ensured by membership rules as
restrictive as those currently in effect in the major professional sports leagues.
Instead of requiring a super-majority vote for expansion, the leagues could
simply require that prospective owners meet certain objective standards
designed to ensure their ability to manage a team effectively. It would, for
example, be reasonable for the leagues to require that applicants have a
minimum net worth and proven experience in managing a similar business. 169
A more open membership policy would, in fact, enhance managerial
competence in professional sports leagues. With open access, a truly free
market in the purchase and sale of franchises would prevail, and the market
would force team owners to operate more efficiently. Since qualified cities
could obtain expansion teams, ineffective owners would find it more difficult to
escape their problems by moving to another city. Owners would have a greater
incentive to satisfy the fans in their home cities by controlling their costs and
putting a quality team on the field.
Finally, competitive balance may be harmed if a league is required to
expand to a city which is incapable of supporting a professional sports
franchise. A franchise cannot field a competitive team on a consistent basis if
the community in which it is located lacks sufficient fans with the income to
afford ticket prices comparable to those charged by other teams. The leagues
may assert that super-majority requirements are necessary to avoid the granting
of franchises to unqualified cities. By requiring a three-fourths vote, the leagues
can ensure that there is a near-consensus among all owners that expansion to a
particular city is appropriate. However, the leagues can adopt less restrictive
alternatives that would be just as effective. The leagues could, for example,
specify the size and demographic characteristics which cities must demonstrate
before they can be granted expansion franchises. 170
168 Super Bowl, supra note 155, at 427.
169 See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
170 See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
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2. The Capacity Argument
Sports leagues may argue that membership restrictions are required to
prevent the leagues from becoming unwieldy. The effective scheduling of
games becomes more difficult as leagues expand. Natural rivalries among
teams in close geographical proximity may suffer because the teams would have
less opportunity to play each other. Finally, fans' enjoyment may decline if a
league includes more teams than they can easily follow.
The current membership rules of the leagues, however, bear no
relationship to the need to keep the leagues at a manageable capacity. If the
leagues want to avoid exceeding their reasonable capacity, they do not need to
require a three-fourths vote for expansion. Their bylaws can simply specify that
the total number of teams in the league will not exceed a certain number. 171
3. The Free-Rider Argument
A joint venture's membership rules can be designed to protect its partners
against "free-riding," that is, the ability of latecomers to obtain the benefits of
the initial partners' investment at little or no cost. The initial investors in a joint
venture assume considerable risk. By restricting access to the venture, they can
insure that third parties cannot free-ride on their initial investment.17 2 The
courts may discourage innovation when they void such membership rules.
Firms may be less willing to risk an investment in a start-up joint venture if they
believe that other firms can easily join the venture after it becomes
successful. 173
These free-rider arguments do not justify the current restrictive membership
rules of the professional sports leagues. Each of the leagues has been successful
for decades, and many new teams have been admitted that did not assume the
initial risk of the leagues' establishment. If the leagues did not have any free-
rider problems with past expansion teams, they should not have such problems
171 See infra note 191 and accompanying text
172 See Donald I. Baker, Compulsory Access to Network Joint Ventures Under the
Shernan Act: Rules orRoulette?, 1993 UTAH L. Rav. 999, 1071-73, 1077.173 See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 70 ("[Florcing entry by latecomers would
encourage everyone to refrain from investing in the venture during its early, high risk period
because everyone would have a right to join later when the risks have been overcome, and
thus avoid investment in a venture that might fail."); Panel Discussion, Exclusionary
Conduct, 57 Amrrrausr L.J. 723, 742 (1988) (remarks by William F. Baxter) ("Someone
invested in that essential facility. Someone got out front when it wasn't at all clear that the
facility was going to work, and now someone else wants to come along and help themselves.
The doctrine is a very dangerous one.").
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with teams that are added in the future. 174
The free-rider argument against the expansion of sports leagues is also
specious because the incumbent owners have generally increased the return on
their investment as a result of the addition of new teams. Fan attendance in the
leagues has grown following each major expansion.175 Furthermore, the
owners have received increasingly large admission fees from new teams. In
1995, for example, Charlotte and Jacksonville each paid a $140 million
expansion fee to the NFL. This fee was 875 % higher than the fee paid by the
Tampa Bay Buccaneers and Seattle Seahawks twenty years ago.' 76 Major
League Baseball recently charged $150 million fees to the expansion teams in
Arizona and Tampa Bay. Those fees were 2400 % higher than the amount paid
by the Seattle Mariners nineteen years ago.177 Fees of such magnitude should
adequately compensate the current owners for any loss of revenue (such as a
smaller portion of national television earnings) which may result from the
admission of a new team. 178
VI. ACCEPTABLE MEMBERSHIP RULES FOR SPORTS LEAGUES
It would not take many test cases for the courts to establish the parameters
of acceptable membership rules for the professional sports leagues. Under the
approach described in this Article, the courts would void the current
membership rules of each of the leagues because they are broader than
necessary to promote the leagues' legitimate objectives. 179 However, the sports
leagues would not be required to eliminate all membership restrictions. The
leagues would be allowed to establish certain rules for the admission of new
teams, including minimum eligibility standards, capacity limits, and
requirements for the payment of reasonable franchise fees.
174 "For open membership ventures, the free rider argument that the new applicant did
not incur any risk at formation time is irrelevant. None of the subsequently admitted members
had to incur these risks, but most are admitted nonetheless." Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at
102. 175 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
17 6 See Patrick, supra note 82.
177 See id.; see also Chass, supra note 88.
17 8 See Chicago Prof 1 Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d
667, 675 (7th Cir. 1992) ("When payment is possible, free-riding is not a problem because
the 'ride' is not free."). But see Ross, supra note 4, at 657 (arguing that "[t]he smaller share
of television revenues offsets the benefit of the one-time entry fee in just a few years").17 9 See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
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A. Eligibility Standards
Leagues must be able to enforce certain eligibility standards in order to
maintain competitive balance among teams. One commentator has pointed out
that a sandlot baseball team could cover the costs of playing the New York
Yankees, but if such a team entered Major League Baseball, "the legitimacy of
athletic competition and thus the very existence of the professional sport would
be threatened." 180 Several courts have held that sports organizations can
exclude players who fail to meet reasonable eligibility requirements. 181 Thus,
the courts should uphold requirements that applicants for professional sports
franchises have the financial ability and related business experience to insure
that they can field a team that will be competitive with the other teams in the
league.
The leagues also should be able to enforce rules as to the size and
demographic characteristics of metropolitan areas which will be granted
expansion teams. Obviously, certain cities do not have sufficient fans with the
interest and wherewithal to support a profitable franchise in one of the major
professional sports. Recent studies have identified the qualities that are likely to
predict an area's ability to support a sports team, including population,
demographics, average income, and the number of local companies able to
purchase luxury seats. 182 The leagues should be permitted to refuse to grant an
expansion team to metropolitan areas which do not possess such qualities. The
leagues should also be able to deny franchises to cities which already have a
franchise in the same league, if the city is not large enough to support more
than one team. 183
180 HENRY DEMMERT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 91 (1973); see
also Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 108 ("[S]urely an antitrust court should not go as far as to
hold that any qualified group of eleven strong athletes plus a coach should be permitted to join
the NFL.").
181 See Dessen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of Am., 358 F.2d 165, 170-72 (9th Cir.
1966) (reasonable for PGA to require golfers to meet certain eligibility rules in order to
prevent tournaments from becoming bogged down with inferior players); Cokin v. American
Contract Bridge League, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,367 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
(expulsion of members for violation of league rules was not per se unlawful group boycott);
Manok v. Southeast Dist. Bowling Ass'n, 306 F. Supp. 1215, 1219-21 (C.D. Cal. 1969)
(suspension of bowler for participating in tournament under assumed name was lawful);
Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("A rule
... providing for the suspension of those who place wagers on games in which they are
participating seems not only reasonable, but necessary for the survival of the league.").
182 See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
183 Only the largest metropolitan areas in America (including New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, and the San Francisco Bay Area) are likely to be able to support more than one
17151996]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Studies have shown that several "have-not" cities in the United States are
now qualified to host a professional sports franchise. 184 The eligibility standards
adopted by the leagues should be broad enough to permit the granting of
franchises to such cities. One study concluded that at least eleven more cities
could support major league baseball teams. 185 Another study estimated that
Major League Baseball could double the number of its franchises from the
current thirty to a total of sixty teams. 186 A recent economic model suggests
that there are a number of viable locations without NHL franchises.' 8 7 The
NFL's recent expansion to Jacksonville indicates that it believes that the fifty-
fifth largest metropolitan area in the United States can support an NFL team.188
There are twenty-seven metropolitan areas with larger populations that do not
have NFL teams, 189 and the NFL would find it difficult to argue that they could
not also maintain a professional football franchise. 19
franchise in the same sport. However, since there is little, if any, cross-elasticity of demand
between the different professional sports, see supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text, a
league should not be able to deny an expansion team to an otherwise qualified city simply
because it already has a franchise in another professional sport.
184 See Ty Ahmad-Taylor, Who Is Major Enough for the Major Leagues?, N.Y. TZIEs,
Apr. 2, 1995, at E5.
185 See id.
186 See BuL JAMES, THE BiLL JAmEs BA EBALL ABmACT 1988 at 21 (1988).
187 See Jones and Ferguson, Location and Survival in the National Hockey League, 36 J.
INDus. ECON. 443, 455 (1988). The NBA and the NHL have recently added more expansion
teams than either the NFL or Major League Baseball. See supra note 88. However, this does
not mean that the NBA and NHL are closer to fll capacity. The NFL, for example, has a
forty-five man roster. An NBA team, however, must carry only twelve men, and an NHL
team twenty-four men. Thus, the NBA and NHL can more easily expand without exceeding
the available pool of talented players. Furthermore, NBA and NHL teams have lower costs
than teams in Major League Baseball or the NFL. They therefore should be able to expand to
smaller metropolitan areas. The average 1994 payroll for a Major League Baseball team was
$35 million, and the NFL's 1994 salary cap was $34.6 million. See Sizing Up Salary Caps,
USA TODAY, Dec. 23, 1994, at C3. By contrast, the NBA's 1994 salary cap was only $16
million, see id., and the payroll of each NHL team averaged only $13 million in 1994, see
Hochberg, supra note 34, at Al. Basketball and hockey teams also often share the same
arena, while the trend for baseball and football is away from dual-sport stadiums and toward
single-sport venues. See Ozanian, supra note 122.
188 See Sandomir, supra note 105.
189 Tim WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcr 1996 389-91 (Robert Famighetti et al
eds.).
190 As Leigh Steinberg, the player agent, has stated, "Plenty more smaller markets can
get in. If Jacksonville, the number fifty-five market, can have a team, so can Columbus,
which ranks thirty-fourth." Sandomir, supra note 105.
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B. Capacity Limits
In order to ensure its efficiency, a league should be allowed to maintain
reasonable limits on the total number of teams that can participate in the
league. 191 At some point, each professional sports league will reach a capacity
beyond which it cannot effectively expand. If there were too many franchises in
a league, effective scheduling of games would become impossible, and fans
would find it difficult to follow all of the teams. Also, without any aggregate
limit, the number of teams eventually would exceed the pool of players with
sufficient talent to play the relevant professional sport. 192
None of the professional sports leagues, however, is yet at full capacity,
and the leagues should not be able to use the capacity argument as a rationale
for refusing to grant franchises to qualified applicants from cities that can
support a franchise. Major League Baseball currently has thirty teams, the NFL
has thirty, the NBA has twenty-nine, and the NHL has twenty-six. None of
these figures indicates that the leagues are close to a capacity ldvel which would
be likely to cause problems with scheduling, fan interest or obtaining a
reasonable pool of talented players. The leagues can avoid problems with
schedules and fan interest by realigning into additional conferences. They can
be assured that player talent will be distributed evenly over a larger number of
teams through the player drafts and as a result of competition among teams to
attract free agents.
C. Franchise Fees
Professional sports leagues should be permitted to establish reasonable
entrance fees for new teams. Such fees avoid the free-riding problems that
would otherwise result from the admission of new franchises. 193 As the Fifth
Circuit pointed out in Realty Mufti-List, however, the amount charged for an
191 See Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Assoc. of Am., 358 F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir.
1966) (exclusion from PGA sponsored golf tours found reasonable in light of necessity for
some limitation in size of playing field).
192 The availability of talented players may also require limits on the frequency of
expansion. Expansion teams are stocked with players chosen from existing teams as well as
from the player draft The existing teams cannot be expected to transfer an unlimited number
of their players to expansion teams. See Super Bowl, supra note 155, at 426-27; see also J.
WosrART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 737 (Supp. 1985) (arguing that unreasonable
expansion will exceed the ability or willingness of current owners to subsidize new teams with
their players). Thus leagues may legitimately prescribe minimum periods of time that must
elapse between the granting of expansion franchises.
193 See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text
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admission fee should not be left to joint venture members' arbitrary discretion.
Rather, admission fees must be determined by objective standards, such as the
costs incurred by the current members as a result of the entry of a new
member.194
It should therefore be permissible for a sports league to require a new team
to compensate current owners for the reduced share of national television
revenues resulting from the team's admission to the league.' 95 A league should
not, however, be given carte blanche to set entry fees at any level it wishes.
Excessively high fees would constitute just as great a hurdle to expansion as the
leagues' current super-majority requirements. Since the appropriate amount to
charge a new team can only be determined at the time of its admission, the
leagues' bylaws could not establish specific admission fees. They should simply
set forth the principle that such fees must be related to the costs incurred by the
league and its existing teams in connection with the admission of a new
member.
VII. THE COURTS' ABILITY TO REGULATE THE EXPANSION OF SPORTS
LEAGUES
Several commentators have argued that the federal courts are not capable of
controlling access to essential facilities, because they cannot effectively perform
the ongoing regulatory function required by an open access order. 196 In order
to make an open access decree both fair and effective, the courts would have to
decide, first, which firms should be deemed qualified for admission and,
subsequently, the specific terms on which entry should be granted.
Commentators have pointed out that open access decrees would be
particularly complex in the case of professional sports leagues. According to
these commentators, no objective standard exists by which a court could
determine the cities in which expansion is feasible.1 7 It would be difficult, if
not impossible, for a court to objectively determine whether a team could
194 See United States v. Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d 1351, 1385-86 (5th Cir. 1980).
The court thus invalidated a bylaw of a real estate multiple listing service which gave the
service's board of directors the discretion to determine the amount of the relevant entry fee.
See id. at 1385.
195 One commentator has argued that such costs should also include reduced attendance
resulting from the initial mediocre play of expansion teams. See Noll, Alternatives in Sports
Policy, in GovERNMENT AND TnE SPORTS BusIEss 415 (1974).
196 See Baker, supra note 172, at 1076; Steve Lohr, Ground Rules for the Great Global
Connection, N.Y. TIMEs, May 7, 1995, at El, E16.
197 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 4, at 709-10.
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generate a reasonable profit in a particular location. 198 Furthermore, a court
would have to consider, not only whether an individual plaintiff met the criteria
to obtain an expansion team, but also whether the city it represented was, on a
national scale, one of the most acceptable expansion sites. Individual courts
would not be well equipped to "allocate new franchises on the basis of a
rational comparison among applicants." 199 A court might be inclined to favor
local applicants, thus creating a "race to the courthouse" among potential
franchise owners. 2°°
Contrary to the views of these commentators, the federal courts are well
qualified to regulate access to the professional sports leagues. Judicial regulation
has long been considered an appropriate response to monopoly power. In the
antitrust area, the federal courts are often called upon to implement ongoing
remedial decrees which require continuing oversight, and the decrees required
for open access to essential facilities are no more complex than those necessary
in other antitrust cases.201 Indeed, in cases such as St. Louis Terninal,
Associated Press, Silver, and Realty Multi-List, the federal courts were able to
fashion appropriate access decrees for essential facilities in other industries.
They should also be able to do so for sports leagues. The federal courts are
perfectly capable of maldng the factual judgments required to determine
whether a particular plaintiff's admission to a sports league is justified.
Furthermore, the complexity of the approach is justified by the serious
economic harms which it is'designed to remedy. The professional sports
leagues are obtaining billions of dollars in monopoly profits from American
fans and taxpayers, and the courts' regulation of the leagues' expansion policies
would significantly diminish those undue subsidies.
The federal courts can adopt objective criteria to determine when expansion
of a league is appropriate. A particular plaintiff's ability to effectively manage a
professional sports franchise will be indicated by his or her financial
wherewithal and experience in managing other businesses. A metropolitan
area's capacity to support a team will be evident from factors such as its
population and income levels. Indeed, several empirical studies have already
indicated the weight that should be afforded such factors in the courts'
198 See id.199 Super Bowl, supra note 155, at 427-28.
200 See Ross, supra note 4, at 710.
201 See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 118. Indeed, open access decrees are more easily
implemented than certain other antitrust remedies, such as divestitures. Professor Ross, for
example, has proposed that the monopoly power of professional sports leagues be remedied
by breaking the current leagues up into separate leagues. See Ross, supra note 4, at 646, 748--
54. However, the approach proposed in this article would accomplish the same purposes in a
less intrusive manner. Instead of having to disband, the leagues would simply have to adopt
more reasonable membership rules.
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analysis.202 By using such standards, the federal courts can avoid local
favoritism in their decisions on league expansion and ensure that new franchises
are awarded pursuant to a rational national perspective. 20 3
The courts' remedial task would become much easier after the initial cases
concerning entry to each of the professional sports leagues. As part of the
remedy in such cases, a court would void the current membership rules of the
leagues and require them to implement more reasonable rules. The leagues
could, for example, be ordered to set forth eligibility standards for applicants,
criteria for cities eligible to host franchises, and the maximum number of teams
that could be admitted to the leagues. A court could retain jurisdiction over a
case until the league had implemented appropriate membership rules. Such an
approach would reduce future litigation and limit the scope of cases to the issue
of whether the leagues had properly applied their new membership policies.
Once a court has determined that a particular team should be admitted to a
league, it must ensure that the league does not unfairly discriminate against the
new entrant. There are many ways in which a league could frustrate a court's
entry order. The league could, for example, impose an excessive entry fee,
decline to adequately share revenue from a national television contract or from
the licensing of league products, or refuse to allow the new entrant to stock its
team with high draft picks or players from existing teams.
The courts can preclude such actions through rather simple decrees similar
to those adopted in other essential facilities cases. The decrees would leave the
maximum possible discretion to the leagues to determine the specific terms for
the admission of new members. The decrees merely need to require the leagues
to admit new members on nondiscriminatory terms. In St. Louis Terminal, for
example, the Supreme Court's decree gave the association members the
discretion to admit members "upon such just and reasonable terms as shall
place such applying company upon a plane of equality in respect of benefits and
202 One economic model commissioned by Major League Baseball found that a Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area with a population of at least 1.25 million could support a
professional sports franchise. See Ross, supra note 4, at 663 n.86. Another study predicted an
area's ability to support a team on the basis of its potential to attract at least 1.5 million fans to
a team with a won-loss percentage of .500. See id. at 756-58 (Appendix A). A recent study
indicated that, based on population, demographics, income levels, and potential corporate
support, at least eleven more metropolitan areas in the United States could support major
league baseball teams. See Abmad-Taylor, supra note 184.
203 Because of the need for national standards in the awarding of franchises, the federal
courts' decisions on league expansion should be deemed to pre-empt any similar decisions by
state courts. See State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966) (finding that
federal antitrust exemption for baseball pre-empted decision under Wisconsin antitrust law
requiring Major League Baseball to grant expansion franchise to Milwaukee).
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burdens with the present proprietary companies." 204 In Realty Multi-List, the
Fifth Circuit fashioned a similar decree requiring the multiple listing service to
reform its bylaws to permit applicants to become members upon "just and
reasonable terms." 205 A similarly broad order is appropriate for sports leagues.
In most cases, it should be sufficient for the courts to require that the leagues
admit a new member on terms that will place it on an equal basis with the
current teams with respect to admission fees, revenue sharing, and the
availability of players.
It will be relatively easy for the courts to guarantee equal treatment for
revenue sharing and the drafting of players. They can simply require the
leagues to treat teams whose entry is compelled in the same way as they have
treated other teams which have been granted expansion franchises. It will be
more difficult to determine the amount which leagues may charge for an
admission fee. The last admission fee paid by an expansion franchise may not
be an adequate standard because of changed circumstances. A league should be
allowed to charge a new team for the costs incurred by the existing teams as a
result of its entry to the league, including each team's reduced share of national
television revenues. 2°6 Since the leagues themselves can best determine the
amount of such costs, a court would be well advised to leave them with the
maximum possible discretion. After ordering expansion, a court could retain
jurisdiction over a case and, if the parties were unable to agree on an admission
fee, they could litigate the issue of the amount of costs that should be amortized
by the fee.207
VII. POTENTIAL LEGAL OBSTACLES TO SPORTS LEAGUES' COMPELLED
EXPANSION
A. Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
The courts cannot compel Major League Baseball to adopt a less restrictive
membership policy unless either the Supreme Court or Congress overrules
baseball's antitrust exemption. The Supreme Court exempted baseball from the
antitrust laws in the 1922 case, Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National
204 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 441 (1912).
205 United States v. Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d 1351, 1387 (5th Cir. 1980).
206 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
207 In International Boxing Club of New York v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959), the
Supreme Court affirmed a decree requiring the compulsory leasing of Madison Square
Garden for boxing events. The defendant was ordered to lease the stadium to any qualified
promoter at a reasonable rental rate. The decree provided that if the parties could not agree on
such a rate, they could apply to the court for a determination thereof. See id. at 261 n. 10.
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League.208 Justice Holmes concluded in that case that the business of baseball
principally involved intrastate activities to which the federal antitrust laws did
not apply.209 Although this decision has been called "a curious vestige of early
twentieth century Commerce Clause jurisprudence," 210 the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed baseball's antitrust exemption on two other occasions, most recently
in 1972.211 It is therefore unlikely that the Court would overrule the
exemption. 212 The prospects of a legislative overruling of the exemption are
also uncertain. During and immediately following the major league baseball
strike of 1994-1995, several bills were introduced in Congress to end baseball's
antitrust exemption, but none of the proposals reached the floor of either the
House or the Senate. 213
Congress should act as soon as possible to overrule baseball's antitrust
exemption and permit the courts to review the expansion policies of Major
League Baseball. The Major Leagues have added only six teams in the last
twenty-five years. 214 The scarcity of franchises has allowed the baseball owners
to obtain significant subsidies from fans and taxpayers. The expansion fees
received by the leagues have escalated from $2.45 million per team in 1960 to
$150 million per team in 1995.215 Although no baseball team has relocated
since the Washington Senators changed their name and moved to Texas in
1972,216 many teams have used the threat of relocation to induce cities to
208 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
209 See id. at 208-09.
2 10 Bauer, supra note 21, at 267.
211 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-85 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees,
346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953) (per curiam).
2 12 Although the Court in the Food case described baseball's antitrust exemption as an
"aberration," it concluded that it was a problem "of long standing that is to be remedied by
the Congress and not by this Court." F/ood, 407 U.S. at 282, 284. One court, however, has
interpreted baseball's antitrust exemption narrowly, holding that Food limited the exemption
to baseball's "reserve system" for players and that the exemption should not apply to
allegations that Major League Baseball restrained competition in the sale of team franchises.
See Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 421,435-41 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
213 See Keith Bradsher, Congressmen Pledge to Revoke Baseball's Antitrust Exemption,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1994, at 1; Murray Chass, It's lime to Play Hardball on Capitol Hill,
N.Y. TIEs, Jan. 4, 1995, at B7; Mark Maske, Senate Takes on Baseball, WASH. POST,
Aug. 4, 1995, at Fl.2 14 See Patrick, supra note 82; Chass, supra note 88.
215 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
216 See John Romano et al., Focus Slifts to Luring an Existing Franchise, ST.
P-TERSBuRG TIm, June 11, 1991, at Al. Because of its antitrust exemption, Major League
Baseball has been able to control franchise relocations. See Chass, supra note 88. The NFL,
on the other hand, was found to have violated section 1 when it attempted to prevent the
Raiders' move from Oakland to Los Angeles, see Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v.
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subsidize new stadiums. 217 Have-not cities have been willing to go to
extraordinary lengths to obtain major league franchises.218 If Congress would
overrule baseball's antitrust exemption, the federal courts could force the Major
Leagues to grant franchises to qualified owners in cities that could support
teams, thus reducing the owners' ability to obtain undue subsidies.
B. Statutes
Congress has passed two statutes granting narrow antitrust exemptions to
the professional sports leagues. Neither statute would prevent the courts from
adopting the approach proposed in this Article. A 1966 law permitted the NFL
to merge with its only rival at that time, the American Football League.219
Although the statute allowed the NFL to acquire its monopoly power, it did not
extend an antitrust exemption to its abuse of that power.220 Nothing in the law
authorizes the NFL teams to agree among themselves to restrict the output of
franchises through unreasonably exclusionary membership rules.
The other statutory antitrust exemption allows the members of Major
League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL to sell package rights to the
networks to broadcast league games.221 The law is narrowly drawn and does
not apply to alleged violations of the Sherman Act resulting from conduct other
than the sale of broadcast rights.
National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), and as a consequence, NFL
teams have been willing to defy the NFL's relocation rules, see supra notes 42-44 and
accompanying text.217 For example, Cuyahoga County built a new stadium for the Cleveland Indians after
Fay Vincent, the Commissioner of Baseball, stated that the franchise might move if it had to
continue to play in Cleveland Stadium. See Leigh Montville, Anxiety in Cleveland, SPORTS
ILLuSTATED, May 21, 1990, at 124. For other examples of such threats, see supra note 118
and accompanying text.
2 18 The St. Petersburg-Tampa Bay area, for example, was so desperate to obtain a
Major League Baseball team that it built a $110 million domed stadium which sat empty for
five years before it was granted an expansion franchise. See Romano, supra note 216; Rod
Beaton & Mel Antonen, Expansion Teams Pumping Up Fans, Economies, USA TODAY,
Mar. 10, 1995, at C10.
2 19 See Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800 § 6(b)(1), 80 Stat. 1515 (1966),
codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
220 See Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 784 (3d Cir.
1983).
221 See Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1982).
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C. Common Law Precedent
There is limited common law precedent against the compelled expansion of
sports leagues. In two cases, the Third and Ninth Circuits refused to order the
admission of plaintiffs to the NFL and NHL. Each of those cases, however,
was based on the erroneous assumption that professional sports teams do not
compete with each other on an economic basis. That assumption runs contrary
to the realities of the modern sports marketplace, where owners are competing
more intensely than ever to enhance their revenues and the market value of
their teams. 222 Those decisions are also at odds with the federal courts'
prevailing view that sports teams are, in fact, economic rivals whose collective
action can injure competition in the relevant market.
In Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL,223 the plaintiffs owned the Grizzlies, a
Memphis football team which had originally played in the World Football
League. The Grizzlies applied for admission to the NFL and were rejected. The
owners of the team sued the NFL, claiming that the league's refusal to grant
them a franchise in Memphis constituted a per se illegal group boycott. The
district court granted summary judgment for the NFL, and the Third Circuit
affirmed. The Circuit Court assumed that economic competition could only
occur between professional football teams in the same geographic area.
According to the Third Circuit, the nearest NFL team, which at that time was
280 miles away in St. Louis, was not close enough to compete with the
Grizzlies. 224 Thus, the court believed that competition was not harmed by the
plaintiffs' inability to obtain a franchise. The court concluded that entry to the
NFL could not be compelled under the essential facilities doctrine because
"[t]he Grizzlies have simply failed to show how competition in any arguably
relevant market would be improved if they were given a share of the NFL's
monopoly power."225
In Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. N!-L, 226 a Seattle hockey team which had
been a member of the World Hockey Association alleged that the NHL had
violated section 1 by refusing to admit it to the league. As the Third Circuit had
222 See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
223 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
224 See Mid-South Grizrlies, 720 F.2d at 787.
225 Id. A recent case relied on Grizzles in dismissing a complaint alleging that the NFL
unlawfully refused to grant an expansion franchise. In Murray v. National Football League,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9108, at *36-37 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 1996), the court held that the
NFL's refusal to grant an expansion franchise to the plaintiffs for the cities of St. Louis or
Hartford was "not cognizable as an injury to competition." Id. at *37. Citing Gizz/es, the
court pointed out that, at the time of the suit, there was no NFL team in either area with
which an expansion team would have competed. See id.
226 783 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1986).
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in Grizzlies, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint
on the grounds that it was not a competitor of the other teams in the NHL.
Citing Grizzlies, the court pointed out that competition could not have been
harmed because there was no other major league hockey team in the Seattle
market with which the plaintiff would have competed.2 27
The Grizzlies and Seattle Totens cases were wrongly decided. They
assumed that teams in a sports league can only compete on an economic basis if
they are in close geographic proximity. In fact, however, the owners of
professional sports franchises are in national competition with each other. All of
the owners in a league compete to maximize the value of their teams in the
national market for sports franchises. Adding a new team to a league is
equivalent to bringing an additional competitor into that market. The Grizzlies
and Seattle Totems courts failed to recognize that expansion of the NFL and
NHL likely would have benefited consumers. As a result of the increase in the
number of franchises in each league, the prices of all franchises would have
fallen and the current owners would have had a greater incentive to manage
their teams efficiently.228
The Grizzlies and Seattle Totems cases are in conflict with the predominant
trend in the federal courts' approach to professional sports leagues. Recent
cases involving player restrictions, television broadcast rights, and franchise
relocation have found that all of the teams in a sports league are economic
competitors and that intraleague competition is worthy of protection under the
antitrust laws. If the Grizzlies and Seattle Totems courts had also recognized that
the members of sports leagues are economic rivals, they would have been
compelled to conclude that the NFL and NHL owners could not legally refuse
227 See id. at 1350. Although not directly on point, other cases have found that the teams
in a sports league do not compete on an economic basis. In Levin v. National Basketball
Association, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the plaintiffs alleged that the NBA violated
section 1 by refusing to approve their application to purchase the Boston Celtics. Although the
court rightly pointed out that the rejection of the application did not adversely affect
competition (because such rejection did not affect the number of clubs in the NBA), the court
stated in dicta that section 1 did not apply because the plaintiffs "wanted to become partners
with, not competitors of, those who excluded them." Id. at 152 n.6. In San Francisco Seals
Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974), the court held that the
refusal of the NHL to permit a San Francisco franchise to move to Vancouver did not violate
section 1. The court based its conclusion on the fact that the NHL teams were not competitors
in an economic sense. See id. at 969.
228 But see Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 110 ("[Siupposing Iowa City's collection of
paid football players, the Buccaneers, wished to join the NFL, the essential facility doctrine
would not come to their rescue. There would be no more competition in the NFL after the
Buccaneers were admitted than before.").
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to consider a potential entrant to their league.229
The federal courts have consistently held that the teams in a league cannot
agree among themselves to limit competition for player services. The courts
have voided agreements among teams to allocate initial rights to bargain with
players through the player drafts230 as well as subsequent limitations on the
rights of players to move from one team to another. 231 They have also
precluded the members of sports leagues from conspiring to limit the number of
games that can be broadcast on television. 232 Each of these cases was based on
the assumption that all of the teams in a particular league are economic
competitors.
In Seattle Totems, the Ninth Circuit failed to appreciate the implications of
its own decision in Raiders, which was rendered just two years earlier. The
Ninth Circuit in Raiders had expressly rejected the NFL's single entity defense
and found that each of the NFL teams compete with each other.233 The court
229 See Roberts, supra note 10, at 282 n.213 ("If one regards each league member as a
competitor in the nationwide market in which player services are purchased and sold, a
league's failure to add a new member could be considered a group of competitors'
exclusionary horizontal boycott designed to prevent another competitor from entering the
market. Such horizontal group boycotts are often found to be illegal per se.").
230 See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding NFL draft
illegal); Boris v. United States Football League, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCII) 66,012 (C.D.
Cal. 1984) (discussing illegality of rule prohibiting teams from selecting player unless his
college eligibility had expired or until at least five years after he entered college); Linseman v.
World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977) (holding illegal rule prohibiting
person under age 20 from playing in professional hockey league); Robertson v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 890-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding NBA draft illegal).
231 See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding
illegal requirement that team acquiring free agent compensate player's former team); Bowman
v. National Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975) (holding illegal agreement
by NFL teams not to sign players who had played for the rival World Football League).
These cases would not preclude the professional sports leagues from continuing to use a
players' draft or restricting the free movement of players if such conditions are included in a
collective bargaining agreement. Under the labor exemption, restraints agreed to in arms-
length bargaining cannot give rise to liability under the antitrust laws. See McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
232 See, e.g., Chicago Prof I Sports Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n, 961 F. 2d
667 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding illegal NBA's limitation on number of times its teams could
appear on television "superstation").
233 In rejecting the single entity argument, the court stated:
To tolerate such a loophole would permit league members to escape antitrust
responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would benefit their league or
enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit would be outweighed by its
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characterized the NFL as "an association of teams sufficiently independent and
competitive with one another to warrant rule of reason scrutiny under section 1
of the Sherman Act." 234 The NFL teams, the court pointed out, possessed all
the indicia of independent competitors. They were independently owned,
separately accounted for profits and losses, and competed with each other to
acquire the best players, coaches, and management personnel. The necessity for
the teams to cooperate in certain ways through their joint venture did not
preclude them from competing with each other:
Although the business interests of league members will often coincide with
those of the NFL as an entity in itself, that commonality of interests exists in
every cartel. ... [Llegitimate collective action should not be construed to
allow the owners to extract excess profits. In such a situation the owners would
be acting as a classic cartel.235
There is no basis for the Grizzlies and Seattle Totems courts' conclusion
that teams in a league compete on a local but not on a national basis. In Seattle
Totems, the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish Raiders by pointing out that
it had only involved the potential restriction of competition in the Los Angeles
area between the Rams and the Raiders.236 In Grizzlies, the Third Circuit stated
that the NFL's rejection of a franchise application for an area which already
had an NFL team "might require a different antitrust analysis than is suggested
by this record." 237 Such an approach, however, is anomalous. It would require
the NFL to grant an expansion team to a qualified applicant in the New York
area, which already has two NFL teams, but not in the Los Angeles area,
which currently has no NFL teams.
The Grizzlies court also failed to appreciate that current intraleague
competition is more worthy of protection than potential future competition
between rival sports leagues. The Third Circuit concluded that the NFL's
refusal to grant a franchise for the Memphis area was "patently pro-
competitive, since it left the Memphis area... as a site for another league's
anticompetitive effects. Moreover, the restraint might be one adopted more for the
protection of individual league members from competition than to help the league.
Los Angeles Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir.
1984) (citing North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257
(2d Cir. 1982)).
234 Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1389.
2 3 5 Id. at 1389, 1392.
236 See Seattle Totems, 783 F.2d at 1350.
237Midwest Grizz/es, 720 F.2d at 787.
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franchise." 238 As one commentator has pointed out, it is "rather dubious" that
the plaintiffs could have competed in the professional football market by
forming another league.239 Indeed, it is impossible for a rival league to compete
with the NFL today,240 and thus competition would have been better enhanced
by allowing the Grizzlies to enter the NFL. In contrast to a highly unlikely
enhancement of competition at some future date, the professional football
market would have enjoyed an immediate benefit from the introduction of a
new competitor.
The Grizzlies court's preference for the formation of a rival league
completely misreads the meaning of the essential facilities cases. Those cases
recognized that certain joint ventures are the only viable means of entry to the
relevant market. Under such circumstances, competition is best enhanced by
permitting all qualified parties to participate in the venture rather than by
forcing them to duplicate it. As the Seventh Circuit concluded in the Fishman
case:
The point of the essential facilities doctrine is that a potential market entrant
should not be forced simultaneously to enter a second market, with its own
large capital requirements. Such a requirement would allow the owner of an
essential facility to monopolize the market as to which his facility is the
'bottleneck.' 241
Most fundamentally, the Third Circuit in Grizzlies and the Ninth Circuit in
Seattle Totems failed to recognize controlling Supreme Court precedent. Both
of those cases are at odds with the Court's decision in NCAA. In that case, the
Court found that the NCAA's member colleges competed against each other for
television revenues, fans, and athletes. 242 The Court pointed out that the
NCAA's restrictions on television broadcasts were particularly suspect, because
they constituted an agreement among competitors to limit their output of a
product. 243 The members of professional sports leagues compete no less
vigorously than the NCAA's member colleges. Furthermore, the sports
leagues' restrictions on the granting of new franchises are no less restrictive of
competition than the NCAA television restrictions. In each case, a sports league
has prevented its members from responding to consumer demand for a highly
desirable product. The owners of teams in the professional sports leagues, like
the colleges participating in the NCAA, should not be allowed to combine with
23 8 Id. at 786.
239 See Roberts, supra note 10, at 282.
240 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
241 Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
242 See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984).
243 See id. at 107-08.
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their competitors to restrict output without a legitimate efficiency
justification. 244
IX. CONCLUSION
The approach proposed in this Article for the antitrust regulation of the
expansion of the professional sports leagues is not radical. Indeed, its
underpinnings lie within the mainstream of antitrust thinking during the last
eighty-five years. As monopolies which control access to the relevant markets,
Major League Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL should be required
to fairly consider all qualified applicants. The arguments made by courts and
commentators for exempting the leagues from antitrust liability are
unpersuasive. There is no substantive distinction between the artificial scarcity
of franchises created by the leagues and the cartel-like activity of competitors
who have attempted to maintain monopoly control in other markets. The
leagues have used their monopoly power to exact enormous subsidies from
sports fans and taxpayers. The courts have at their disposal the tools necessary
to prevent this abuse. Expansion of the professional sports leagues is required
by long-established precedent, and it can be accomplished in a way that protects
the leagues' legitimate efficiency objectives. The federal courts should not
hesitate, at the earliest opportunity, to require the leagues to adopt more open
membership policies that will put an end to the monopoly profits which they
have earned for so many years at the expense of American consumers.
244 In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., No. 95-388, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 4047 (June 20,
1996), the Supreme Court considered the applicability of the non statutory labor antitrust
exemption to multi-employer bargaining by the members of the NFL. The Court emphasized
that the law should not treat multi-employer bargaining any differently than single-employer
bargaining. See id. at *14-15. The Court also pointed out that the members of the NFL are
"more like a single bargaining employer," id. at *31, because "the clubs that make up a
professional sports league are not completely independent economic competitors, as they
depend upon a degree of cooperation for economic survival," id. at *30 (citing National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 101-02). This conclusion is not inconsistent with the
Court's approach in NCAA and does not imply that sports leagues should be treated as a single
economic entity. Indeed, the Court's language recognizes that sports leagues are characterized
by a blend of competition and cooperation. As discussed supra notes 18-47, this characteristic
makes it appropriate to treat sports leagues like any other joint ventures among competitors.
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